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ABSTRACT
The number of displaced persons in the world is at an
unprecedented high. There are more than seventy million people in the
world that are currently searching for a place to live. To put this into
context, if these people were all in the one country it would be the
nineteenth biggest country in the world. There is no tenable solution to
the crisis. A large portion of these displaced people are refugees. The
legal definition of a refugee is relatively narrow. This presents an
obstacle to many people who are in need of protection from being
relocated to any of the countries that are signatories to the Refugee
Convention. The United States is in fact one of the more than 140
countries that have signed this convention and it receives more refugee
applications than any other nation on earth. The key limiting aspect of
the Convention is that for a person to qualify for protection, they must
be in fear of persecution for one of five very specific reasons. These
reasons are race, ethnicity, particular social group, religion and
political opinion. If these grounds are interpreted narrowly it
necessarily means that countries, even those that are signatories to the
Convention, can legitimately refuse to provide asylum to people in need
of protection. Thus, the manner in which the grounds are interpreted
has a profound impact on the ability of displaced people to emigrate to
other nations. In this Article, the Author examines the meaning of one
of these refugee grounds, namely political opinion. The ground has
been interpreted unduly narrowly. The Author examines the history of
the Refugee Convention and the most persuasive jurisprudential
meaning of political opinion and conclude that a broader sphere of
operation should be accorded to this concept. This will provide the
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pathway for a much greater number of asylum seekers being granted
protection in countries such as the United States.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of displaced people in the world currently is at a
record high. Many parts of the world are experiencing an
unprecedented and growing crisis regarding the amount of people that
have been forcibly displaced from their homeland. There is no coherent
or tenable solution to the problem.
In April 2019, the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, Filippo Grandi, addressed the current unabating
displacement crisis in a brief to the United Nations Security Council.
During the briefing, the High Commissioner expressed his concern at
the unprecedented toxic stigmatization that is being directed to
refugees and acknowledged that current responses to the refugee crisis
are becoming increasingly inadequate. However, according to the High
Commissioner, it is “wrong” to view the crisis as one which is
unmanageable because it can be addressed with the right political will
and improved responses. 1 He went on to highlight that the main driver
of refugee displacement is conflict, and so “if conflicts were prevented
or resolved, most refugee flows would disappear,” appealing to
members of the Security Council to help address the root causes of
conflicts and not its symptoms. 2
Preventing or resolving international conflicts is an ideal
aspiration, however, it is not pragmatically tenable given the extent of
geo-political fractures in the world. Accordingly, less ambitious
solutions are necessary to ameliorate the problem of displaced people.
This Article is about providing one such solution.
The means by which more displaced people have been
accommodated in other countries is the Refugee Convention. This
instrument commenced in 1951, and currently there are 145 countries
that are signatories to it. 3 It does not present as being a total solution to
the displaced person crisis, however, given the overwhelming nature of
1. UN’s Grandi Slams ‘Toxic Language of Politics’ Aimed at Refugees, Migrants, UN
NEWS (Apr. 9, 2019), https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/04/1036391 [https://perma.cc/H664UVLB].
2. U.N. SCOR, 74th Sess., 8504th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.8504 (Apr. 9, 2019), available
at https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/admin/hcspeeches/5cf4d2b37/briefing-united-nations-securitycouncil.html [https://perma.cc/XNM3-U2C3].
3. States Parties to the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and the 1967
Protocol U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES [hereinafter UNHCR] 1,
https://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf [https://perma.cc/5YQ5-RAJ7].
Note that there are 146 state parties to the 1967 protocol. See id.
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the crisis and the lack of other plausible solutions, the operation and
scope of the Convention is now more important than ever in providing
a pathway for people to settle in other countries. This is especially true
in relation to the United States given that it receives more refugee
claims than any other country, approximately 250,000 per year in
recent years. 4 Additionally, there are over 900,000 people in the United
States who are awaiting the processing of their claims. 5
In this Article, the Author considers one of the most important
parts of the Convention. In order for a person to qualify for refugee
status, it is essential that they are at risk of persecution for one of five
distinct reasons being race, ethnicity, particular social group, religion,
and political opinion. The focus of this Article is on one of the key, and
most contentious and uncertain refugee grounds, the political opinion
ground. There is no established or settled meaning of the term political
opinion. In this Article, the Author examines the history, jurisprudence,
and the current approach to this concept. The Author argues that the
current approach is unduly restrictive and not consistent with the
overarching objective and rationale for the Convention. The Author
proposes a broader and more jurisprudentially sound definition of
political opinion.
The adoption of this Article’s recommendation will provide a
pathway for a significant increase in the number of displaced people
that would come within the scope of the Convention. This would not
provide a holistic or total solution to the displaced persons crisis.
However, it would significantly enhance the level of flourishing of
large numbers of people who are currently destitute as a result of being
displaced from their homeland. The imperative to now rethink the
definition of a refugee is arguably stronger than at any time in recent
US history, given the considerable restrictions that have recently been
put in place in acknowledging refugee claims and granting asylum in
the United States.
During the 2016 presidential campaign, President Donald Trump
called for “‘a total and complete shutdown’ of Muslims entering the

4. Global
Trends:
Forced
Displacement
in
2018,
UNHCR
(2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2018/ [https://perma.cc/N9HM-S2K3].
5. Transactional Records Access Clearinghouse [TRAC], Immigration Court Backlog
Tool,
TRAC
IMMIGRATION
(Sept.
2019),
https://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/court_backlog/ [https://perma.cc/Z2JS-5JXW].
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United States” 6 and since the beginning of his presidency, the refugee
admissions process has continued to be a key priority. In fact, in the
first week of his presidency, President Trump controversially closed
American borders to all refugees by issuing an executive order that
froze the United States refugee admissions program for 120 days and
banned Syrian refugees indefinitely, who were labeled as “detrimental
to the interests of the United States.” 7 It also included a blanket ninety
-day travel ban for foreign nationals travelling from several Muslim
majority countries. 8 This ban was eventually abandoned after a series
of Federal Courts blocked it. 9 In its place, the Trump Administration
issued a somewhat narrower revised order in March 2017, which reinstated the 120 day suspension of all refugees admissions but replaced
the indefinite bar on Syrian refugees with a 120 day freeze. 10 This too
was struck down by a Federal Judge before its implementation,11
however the Supreme Court allowed the order in part, including the
120 refugee admission suspension, which took effect in late June
2017. 12 Refugee admissions resumed in October 2017, however
citizens from eleven “high-risk” countries continued to be barred from
the United States for a further ninety-day review. 13
6. Jenna Johnson, Trump Calls for ‘Total and Complete Shutdown of Muslims Entering
the United States’, WASH. POST (Dec. 7, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postpolitics/wp/2015/12/07/donald-trump-calls-for-total-and-complete-shutdown-of-muslimsentering-the-united-states/ [https://perma.cc/8AEY-GD69].
7. Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977 (Jan. 27, 2017).
8. Id. at 8978.
9. Adam Liptak, Court Refuses to Reinstate Travel Ban, Dealing Trump Another Legal
Loss, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/09/us/politics/appealscourt-trump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/46LH-ZQAP].
10. Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
11. Alexander Burns, 2 Federal Judges Rule Against Trump’s Latest Travel Ban, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/15/us/politics/trump-travel-ban.html
[https://perma.cc/6WUM-Y29M].
12. Robert Barnes & Matt Zapotosky, Supreme Court Allows Limited Version of Trump’s
Travel Ban to Take Effect and Will Consider Case in Full, WASH. POST (June 26, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-allows-limited-versionof-trumps-travel-ban-to-take-effect-will-consider-case-in-fall/2017/06/26/97afa314-573e11e7-b38e-35fd8e0c288f_story.html [https://perma.cc/J6KF-YMHZ].
13. Peter Baker & Adam Liptak, U.S Resumes Taking in Refugees, but 11 Countries Face
More
Review,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Oct.
24,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/24/us/politics/trump-lifts-refugee-suspension.html
[https://perma.cc/38AS-T5F2]. For resumption of refugee admissions for the affected countries,
see Yeganeh Torbati, U.S. to Resume Refugee Admissions From 11 ‘High-risk’ Countries,
REUTERS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-immigration-refugees/u-s-to-
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Following the expiration of the March 2017 Executive Order,
President Trump introduced the third iteration of the travel ban in
September 2017, taking effect the following month.14 After a number
of challenges in the courts, in a 5-4 decision by the Supreme Court, the
new order was allowed to be implemented in full. 15 This order targets
citizens from seven countries to varying degrees; of which five are
Muslim-majority. It is the citizens of these five countries that are
effectively banned from travelling to the United States. 16 Unlike the
earlier iterations, this ban is not temporary. 17 Thus, reshaping the US
refugee admission program has been a key focus for the Trump
Administration. Most notably, however, the annual refugee cap is the
lowest it has ever been since the creation of the modern Refugee
Program in 1980 which established the ceiling system. 18
The US Government is responsible for setting a cap for the
number of people fleeing persecution in their home countries allowed
to enter the United States. In the final year of the Obama
Administration, the cap was set at 110,000 (this, however, was
subsequently reduced to 50,000 by President Donald Trump). 19 In
2019, the maximum number of refugees allowed into the United States
is 30,000. 20 However, it is important to emphasize that these ceilings
are simply targets. For example, in the 2018 fiscal year (FY), the
refugee ceiling was set at 45,000, but only 22,491 refugees were
admitted. 21 This is currently the lowest record number of admissions
since the system was established in 1980, and is lower than the 27,131
resume-refugee-admissions-from-11-high-risk-countries-idUSKBN1FI27F
[https://perma.cc/DE3Q-BE3W].
14. Proclamation No. 9645, supra note 10. The seven countries targeted by the travel ban
are Iran, Syria, Somalia, Yemen, Libya, North Korea, and Venezuela. Id. at 45163. The practical
effect on North Korean and Venezuelan citizens is limited. Id.
15. Adam Liptak & Michael D. Shear, Trump’s Travel Ban Is Upheld by Supreme Court,
N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/26/us/politics/supreme-courttrump-travel-ban.html [https://perma.cc/8NTS-M7R4].
16. Proclamation No. 9645, supra note 10.
17. Id.
18. ANDORRA BRUNO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31269, REFUGEE ADMISSIONS AND
RESETTLEMENT
POLICY
(2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL31269.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LH3U-CK48].
19. Id. at 3.
20. Id. at 5.
21. Nayla Rush, Refugee Resettlement Roundup for FY 2019, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD.
(Oct.
4,
2019),
https://cis.org/Rush/Refugee-Resettlement-Roundup-FY-2019
[https://perma.cc/XP65-HXRA].
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admissions in FY 2002, following the events of 9/11. 22 As of May 31,
the United States had admitted only 18,051 refugees. 23 Not only has
the Trump Administration lowered the number of people allowed in,
but it has also sought to heavily exclude certain refugees from seeking
asylum in the United States. For example, of the 22,491 refugees
admitted in FY 2018, 16,018 were Christians and 3,495 were
Muslims—that is, seventy-one percent and sixteen percent
respectively. 24
To a lesser extent, the decline in refugee admission numbers is
also due to the tougher vetting procedures and security screening
measures of refugee applicants. 25 The refugee vetting process in the
United States was already considered to be among the most extensive,
with the typical application process taking two years to complete.26
Thus, these additional hurdles not only place an additional barrier on
those seeking safety, but also have led to unduly long processing times
to the already overwhelmed refugee processing system. Thus, while the
refugee cap has been reduced in recent years, processing delays have
also contributed to these caps not being met.
In the next part of the Article, the Author provides an overview of
the current displaced person crisis. This is followed in Part III by an
examination of the history and background to the Refugee Convention.
In Part IV, the Author discusses the current approach to the meaning of
political opinion and argues that it is jurisprudentially and normatively
flawed. Part V of the Article advances a more coherent and normatively
sound definition of political opinion. In the concluding remarks, the

22. BRUNO, supra note 18, at 3.
23. An Overview of U.S. Refugee Law and Policy, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 3 (June 18,
2019), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/overview-us-refugee-law-andpolicy [https://perma.cc/6LN6-YCMT].
24. Jynnah Radford, Key Findings About U.S. Immigrants, PEW RES. CTR. 9 (June 17,
2019), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/06/17/key-findings-about-u-s-immigrants/
[https://perma.cc/CRJ3-YBEP].
25. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., Improved Security Procedures for Refugees
Entering the United States (Oct. 24, 2017), https://www.dhs.gov/news/2017/10/24/improvedsecurity-procedures-refugees-entering-united-states [https://perma.cc/KU2L-8XTQ].
26. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, Refugee Security Screening Fact Sheet 4–7
(Aug.
28,
2018),
https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Refugee%2C%20Asylum%2C%20and%20Int
%27l%20Ops/Refugee_Screening_and_Vetting_Fact_Sheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/C8M7DG3H].
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Author summarizes reform proposals and impact they are likely to have
in relation to settling a high number of displaced people.
II. THE CURRENT DISPLACED PERSON CRISIS
A. Overall Picture Regarding Current Number of Displaced People
The mass displacement of people who are forced to flee their
homes due to conflict or violence has long been documented in human
history. The magnitude of this phenomenon is now at the highest
recorded level in recent history. The global population of forcibly
displaced people today is larger than the population of Thailand. In fact,
if the total global population of forcibly displaced people today were to
be combined to form their own country, they would be the nineteenth
largest country in the world. 27
The most illuminating figures are set out in the most recent annual
study by UN refugee agency, the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (“UNHCR”). According to the UNHCR Global Trends
Report (“UNHCR Report”), 28 in 2018 there were 70.8 million people
who had been forced to leave their homes and seek safety elsewhere.29
This is the eighth consecutive year that the world’s forcibly displaced
population has increased and is 2.3 million higher than the previous
year. 30 This is the highest number of displaced persons recorded since
the agency began collecting data on displaced persons in 1951. 31
The rate at which the displaced population is growing is
staggering. The increase in the population of displaced people is
outstripping the growth of the world’s total population. In 2018, one in
every 108 people worldwide was forcibly displaced. 32 This is
compared to one in every 160 people a decade ago. 33
The marked rate of displacement is further highlighted by the
increase in displaced persons over the most recent seven-year period,
as recorded by UNHCR. In the six-year period from 2012 to 2018, the
displaced population increased by 25.6 million people—from 45.2
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

UNHCR, supra note 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
It was 68.5 million in 2017. Id. at 2 and 5.
Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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million to almost 71 million. 34 In approaching the issue from a
somewhat wider lens, the extent of the crisis is further illuminated. In
1996, there were 37.3 million displaced people in the world. This is an
increase of 33.5 million people in just over twenty years. 35
As noted by the UNHCR Report, the global population of
displaced persons is comprised of different cohorts. It consists of
refugees, who account for almost 26 million; internally displaced
persons (“IDPs”), who comprise over 41 million people; and asylum
seekers, who account for about 3.5 million of the total number of
displaced persons. 36 Stateless persons are not accounted for in this
global total of displaced persons. These are individuals who are not
considered a citizen of any country and thus are denied basic civil and
social rights such as access to education, healthcare, and freedom of
movement. In 2018, UNHCR conservatively estimated that there were
at least ten million stateless persons worldwide. 37
The Syrian civil war has resulted in the most profound refugee
and displaced persons problem in the world since World War II
(“WWII”). It is the single largest driver of displacement. The UNHCR
Report states that Syria recorded the largest population of displaced
persons for the fifth consecutive year with a total of thirteen million
displaced Syrians. 38 This figure is comprised of 6.7 million refugees,
6.2 million internally displaced within the borders of Syria (of which
2.5 million are children), and 140,000 asylum seekers. 39 Other
countries that registered large displaced person populations included
Colombia (8 million), Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (5.4
million), Afghanistan (5.1 million), South Sudan (4.2 million), and
Somalia (3.7 million). 40
As noted above, refugees account for a significant proportion of the
global displaced population—there are currently more refugees
worldwide than at any time since WWII. The number of refugees under
UNHCR’s mandate increased for the eighth consecutive year—from
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 2.
37. Persons of Concern to UNHCR, UNHCR, https://www.unhcr.org/ph/persons-concernunhcr [https://perma.cc/HR54-VDF5] (last visited Jan. 22, 2020).
38. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 6 and 14.
39. Id. at 6.
40. Id. at 6–7.
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10.5 million in 2010, 41 to a record high of 20.4 million in 2018. 42 There
were an additional 5.5 million Palestinian refugees registered under the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency’s mandate. 43 When
combined, the total number of refugees in 2018 stood at twenty-six
million. The significance of the refugee crisis is further underlined by
the fact that half of the world’s refugees continue to be children. 44 The
below chart sets out the rapidly growth in world’s displaced population
in recent years. 45

B.

The Significant Recent Increase in the Number of Displaced
People

The most recent calendar year for which displaced persons figures
have been reported, demonstrates the persistence and magnitude of this
unprecedented displacement crisis and further underscores the pressing
need for a tenable and effective solution. According to UNHCR data,
during the course of 2018 alone, there were 13.6 million people who
were newly displaced; of this number, 10.8 million were internally
displaced inside their own countries, and 2.8 million had sought safety

41. Global Trends 2010, UNHCR 3 (2011), https://www.unhcr.org/4dfa11499.pdf
[https://perma.cc/QA87-8FQV].
42. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 13.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 61.
45. Id.
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abroad (as refugees or asylum seekers). 46 To further illuminate the
marked rate at which the number of displaced persons is increasing,
13.6 million people worldwide were newly displaced worldwide in
2018—that is 37,000 every day. 47
During 2018, there were also 1.1 million people registered as new
refugees. 48 These are persons who sought protection outside their
country of origin and have either been recognized as a refugee on a
prima facie basis or granted temporary protection following a refugee
status determination. Over half of the newly recognized refugees were
Syrians (520,000), of which almost 400,000 were located in Turkey. 49
In addition, there were 1.7 million new asylum claims submitted in
2018. 50
Notably, the United States was the world’s largest recipient of
individual asylum applications for the second consecutive year—with
254,300 applications submitted. 51 A high number of applications were
also made to Germany and Turkey—161,900 and 83,800
respectively. 52 There are a number of factors which have contributed
significantly to the high number of new displacements. This includes a
rise in general violence, unresolved governance challenges, and
protracted armed conflicts, which have caused large scale deterioration
in several countries. 53
As noted above, the Syrian civil war had a particularly
pronounced impact in the global displacement figures since it began in
2011. In 2018 alone, there were almost 900,000 newly displaced
Syrians; of this total, 630,000 Syrians fled the country to find safety
and the remainder were internally displaced within the country. 54
However, it was Ethiopia who accounted for the largest number of
newly displaced persons in the year. There were almost 1.6 million

46. Id. at 20.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 41.
51. Id. at 42.
52. Id. at 3.
53. See generally id.; Global Report on Internal Displacement (2018),
http://www.internal-displacement.org/global-report/grid2018/downloads/2018-GRID.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TBU7-Z4AT].
54. UNHCR, supra note 3.
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newly displaced Ethiopians in 2018 alone—ninety-eight percent were
displaced within the country. 55
The increase in violence and human rights abuses which has been
triggered by the deteriorating political and economic conditions in
Venezuela has also contributed significantly to the growth in displaced
people in recent years. It is estimated that there was an average of 5,000
people leaving Venezuela every day in 2018. 56 Recent data estimates
that by mid-2019 the number of Venezuelans leaving the country
would have reached four million. 57 Alarmingly, one million of these
displacements occurred in the seven months since November 2018.58 It
is estimated that the total figure could reach eight million by the end of
2020. 59 This mass exodus of Venezuelans is one of the biggest
displacement crises in recent history—comparable to those
experienced by war-ravaged Syria.
C. Key Refugee and Displaced Person Producing Countries
The top ten refugee producing countries accounted for a
staggering eighty-two percent of the world’s refugees registered under
UNHCR’s mandate, which has been a consistent trend over recent
years. 60 That is, 16.6 million of the global total of 20.4 million refugees
are under UNHCR’s responsibility. 61 Even more remarkably, about
55. Id. at 6.
56. Siegfried Modola, Venezuelan Outflow Continues Unabated, Stands Now at 3.4
Million, UNHCR 1 (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.unhcr.org/ph/15238-venezuelan-outflowcontinues-unabated-stands-now-at-3-4-million.html [https://perma.cc/SPF2-YGKQ]; Press
Release, International Organization for Migration [IOM] Venezuelan Outflow Continues
Unabated, Population Abroad Now Stands at 3.4 Million, at 1 (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://www.iom.int/news/venezuelan-outflow-continues-unabated-population-abroad-nowstands-34-million [https://perma.cc/MVS7-5NUC].
57. Press Release, IOM, Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela Top 4 Million: UNHCR and
IOM, at 1 (Jun. 7, 2019), https://www.iom.int/news/refugees-and-migrants-venezuela-top-fourmillion-iom-andunhcr?utm_source=IOM+External+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=e34c71ed9bEMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2019_06_06_07_16&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_9968056566e34c71ed9b-43648581 [https://perma.cc/4F9N-2GLY].
58. Id.
59. OAS Working Group to Address the Regional Crisis Caused by Venezuela’s Migrant
and
Refugee
Flows,
ORG.
FOR
AM.
STATES
19
(June
2019),
http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/press/OAS-Report-to-Address-the-regional-crisis-causedby-Venezuelas-migrant.pdf [https://perma.cc/EL36-LDZA].
60. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 18.
61. Id.
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two-thirds of these refugees originate from just five countries—Syria,
Afghanistan, South Sudan, Myanmar, and Somalia. 62
Syria has continued to produce the world’s highest number of
refugees, for the fifth consecutive year. As noted above, there were 6.7
million Syrian refugees reported in 2018. 63 This is unprecedented in
recent history for a single country and is a significant increase since
2014, when the total displaced population was estimated to be 7.6
million, of which about 3.9 million were refugees. 64 This is the world’s
biggest refugee crisis.
The second largest group of refugees were Afghans. In fact,
Afghanistan was the largest refugee producing country for more than
thirty years, until 2014 when it was surpassed by Syria. 65 In 2018, it
was estimated that some 2.7 million Afghans had fled the country in
search of international protection. 66 As in previous years, Pakistan
shouldered the majority of Afghan refugees (over 1.4 million) followed
by the Islamic Republic of Iran (951,100) in 2018—combined this
equates to almost ninety percent of the total Afghan refugee
population. 67
The on-going civil conflict in South Sudan produced the third
largest refugee group under UNHCR’s mandate, with 2.3 million
refugees worldwide in 2018. 68 The remaining top ten-refugeeproducing countries in 2018 were Myanmar (1.1 million), Somalia
(900,000), Sudan (724,800), DRC (720,300), Central African Republic
(590,900), Eritrea (507,300), and Burundi (387,900). 69
In addition to these refugee numbers, there were 2.1 million
applications for refugee status submitted by asylum seekers across 158
countries in 2018. 70 An asylum seeker is an individual who has sought
asylum protection outside of their country of origin however their
application has yet to be assessed. Further, a considerable proportion
62. Id. at 3.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2014,
UNHCR
(2015),
https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/statistics/country/556725e69/unhcr-global-trends-2014.html
[https://perma.cc/44RN-DGJM].
66. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 3.
67. Id. at 14.
68. Id. at 3.
69. Id. at 15.
70. Id. at 41.
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of these applications, 1.7 million, were new applicants. 71 Venezuelans
lodged the highest number of asylum claims in 2018 (341,800) with the
majority made in Peru, Brazil, and the United States. 72 Afghans and
Syrians lodged the second and third highest number of asylum claims
in 2018, each having made just over 100,000 claims. 73
To further complete the picture regarding countries which have
produced the highest numbers of displaced persons, just ten countries
account for seventy-six percent of the world’s total number of IDP’s. 74
As noted above, IDP’s constitute the largest cohort of displaced people
in 2018, totaling 41 million. 75 Colombia registered the highest number
of IDP’s due to conflict or violence within the country—7.8 million.76
Other countries that were reported as having high levels of internal
displacement included Somalia (2.6 million), Ethiopia (2.6 million)
and, Yemen (2.1 million). 77
D. Poor Countries Continuing to Shoulder Disproportionate Burden
of Admitting Displaced People
The data shows that there is an unrelenting trend of poor countries
bearing a disproportionate burden of the refugee intake. The incidence
of displaced and refugee persons is heavily concentrated within just a
few regions. Nine of the top ten refugee hosting countries in 2018 were
developing countries, and combined hosted eighty-four percent of the
world’s refugees. 78
More broadly, the data shows that the world’s least developed
countries (this includes South Sudan, DRC, and Ethiopia—who each
are among the top ten refugee-hosting countries) host one-third of the
global refugee total. In other terms, 6.7 million refugees under the
UNHCR’s mandate are located in the world’s most impoverished
countries with unstable political and rule of law institutions. 79 The
world’s least developed countries account for only 1.25% of global
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id.
Id. at 44-45.
Id. at 45.
Id. at 35-37.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id. at 37.
Id. at 18.
Id. at 17-18.
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GDP. 80 This is in stark contrast to the 16% of refugees that are hosted
by high income, developed countries. 81
Looking at it from another measure, low to middle income
countries host an average of 5.8 refugees per 1000 of population. This
is in stark comparison to the average of 2.7 per 1000 of population in
high-income countries. 82 The below table sets out the ten countries that
hosted the largest refugee number of refugees in 2018. 83

Turkey was the country most affected by the refugee burden for
the fifth consecutive year—hosting 3.7 million refugees in 2018. 84 This
is a significant increase from 1.6 million refugees the country hosted in
2014. 85 The refugee population in Turkey is comprised almost
exclusively of Syrians (ninety-eight percent—this is the largest Syrian
refugee intake by any single country. Over the course of 2018 alone,
80. Id.
81. Id. at 2.
82. Worldwide Displacement Tops 70 Million, UN Refugee Chief Urges Greater Solidarity
in
Response,
UNHCR
3
(June
19,
2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/enau/news/press/2019/6/5d03b22b4/worldwide-displacement-tops-70-million-un-refugee-chiefurges-greater-solidarity.html [https://perma.cc/H6L6-4J8K].
83. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 17.
84. Id. at 3.
85. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, UNHCR 15 (2016),
https://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/576408cd7/unhcr-global-trends-2015.html
[https://perma.cc/V2NR-2FBC].

518

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:3

Turkey took in about 500,000 new refugees—over 100,000 were
newborns. 86 Pakistan was the second largest host of refugees, with a
refugee population of 1.4 million, which is almost entirely made up of
Afghans. 87 The third largest country of asylum was Uganda
(1,165,000) as a result of the conflict in neighboring South Sudan.88
According to UNHCR, other countries that provided safety for a high
number of refugees in 2018 included Sudan, Germany, Islamic
Republic of Iran, Lebanon, Bangladesh, Ethiopia, and Jordan. 89 Thus,
it is clear from this data that responsibility for the world’s refugee crisis
is overwhelmingly carried by countries with the least resources to
absorb and accommodate the needs of those seeking refuge.
The contrast between refugees and asylum seekers is not the
source countries of these respective groups, but rather the destinations
where they are seeking to be located. They are invariably first world
wealthy countries with the exception of Peru, who experienced a drastic
increase in asylum applications as a result of the crisis in Venezuela.
Peru received the second largest number of claims for asylum in 2018
with 192,500 claims lodged. 90 This is compared to 37,800 in 2017 and
4,400 in 2016. 91
The largest recipient of new individual asylum claims in 2018 was
the United States, for the second consecutive year. There were
approximately 250,000 claims lodged. 92 As with previous years,
applicants from Central America and Mexico make up about half of all
asylum applications to the United States, specifically El Salvador,
Guatemala and Venezuela 93--areas that are considered as one of the
most violent in the world largely due to the on-going increase in gang-

86. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 18.
87. Id. at 3, 14.
88. Id. at 3, 8.
89. Id. at 70-73.
90. Id. at 3.
91. Id. at 42.
92. Id. at 3.
93. Id. at 8. See also Nora Sturm, UNHCR Calls for Urgent Action as Central America
Asylum
Claims
Soar,
UNHCR
(Apr.
5,
2016),
http://www.unhcr.org/enau/news/latest/2016/4/5703ab396/unhcr-calls-urgent-action-central-america-asylum-claimssoar.html [https://perma.cc/BCU7-L5R7].
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related violence. 94 A total of 94,000 of these asylum applications
originated from these three countries alone. 95
As with previous years, Germany continues to receive a high
number of asylum claims. In 2018, 161,900 were lodged in Germany,
with Syrians being the most common nationality of these applicants
(44,200). 96 However, this is a significant decrease from the 722,400
that were submitted in 2016. 97 According to UNHCR data, other
countries which registered the largest numbers of asylum applications
in 2018 were France (114,500), Turkey (83,800), Brazil (80,000),
Greece (65,000), Spain (55,700), Canada (55,400), and Italy
(48,900). 98
E. Overview of the United States’ Response to Accepting Displaced
People
Thus, from the above it follows that the United States is one of the
most common target countries by prospective refugees. The number of
people seeking asylum in the United States is rapidly increasing given
the recent upheaval in Venezuela and other parts of Central America.
The increase in refugee numbers has paradoxically been met by a
reduction in the refugee cap set by the United States. Even though the
cap has been reduced, administrative and processing delays have meant
that even these lower caps have not been filled with refugees that have
been granted asylum. The entire process of dealing with and processing
refugee applications is fundamentally broken. There are many political
and social reasons associated with this, including the appetite that a
nation has for receiving refugee applicants.
Another consideration that complicates and compromises the
refugee pathway is the uncertainty surrounding the characteristics of
people that qualify as refugees. This is a legal question. If further clarity
94. For a discussion of the violence and crime in this region, see Joshua Partlow, Why El
Salvador Became the Hemisphere’s Murder Capital, WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2016/01/05/why-el-salvador-becamethe-hemispheres-murder-capital/?utm_term=.6695dbb3d9b5 [https://perma.cc/MQ26-XMPY];
Amelia Cheatham, Central America’s Turbulent Northern Triangle, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
RELATIONS (Oct. 1, 2019), https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/central-americas-turbulentnorthern-triangle [https://perma.cc/N724-EKMW].
95. UNHCR, supra note 3.
96. Id.
97. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2016,
UNHCR
(2019),
https://www.unhcr.org/globaltrends2016/ [https://perma.cc/MU49-A9FY].
98. UNHCR, supra note 3, at 42-43.
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is injected into the refugee determination process, this will clear the
pathway for more rational and objective political and social decisions
to be made regarding refugee quotas and the manner in which asylum
claims are processed. In the remainder of this Article, the Author
focuses on this legal issue and more pointedly at the definition of
political opinion, which is one of the five grounds for refugee status. In
light of the above, the Author now discusses a pathway to ameliorate
the refugee crisis in a logical and coherent manner. Prior to doing so
and to contextualize the Author’s recommendations, the Author
provides a brief overview on the background and history of the Refugee
Convention.
III. HISTORY AND BACKGROUND TO THE REFUGEE
CONVENTION
In this part of the Article, the Author provides a brief historical
review of international refugee protection, specifically looking at a
number of refugee agreements that were developed in response to a
number of discrete refugee movements in the aftermath of World War
I (“WWI”). These instruments had a considerable impact in shaping the
modern era of refugee law in the form of the 1951 Convention Relating
to the Status of Refugees. 99 Thus, it is necessary to first examine the
origin and history of the refugee problem during the early 20th century
to understand the scope and potential application of the Refugee
Convention.
A. The First Agreements
The twentieth century was a period of mass disturbance and
movement on a large global scale following numerous political events
and violent conflicts in Europe. Governments were particularly illprepared for the mass population flows that arose following WWI and
in the absence of protection obligations on governments or the
existence of a central body, legal responses by governments to this
displaced person crisis was not in any regular or systematic manner.

99. U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 150
[hereinafter 1951 Refugee Convention].
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Rather, those displaced by the war were left largely dependent on the
material assistance and relief provided by charitable organizations. 100
The earliest refugee group to attract and receive the attention of
the international community were Russian citizens who had been
displaced following the breakdown of the Russian Empire. 101 This
group of people faced what were then unprecedented challenges to
relocation. The first significant obstacle was the sheer number of
people that were displaced. It is estimated that by 1922, there were at
least 1.5 million Russian refugees who had been displaced and were
scattered across Europe—making it the largest post-war group of
political refugees. 102 Although refugees had existed prior to this time,
large groups of refugees were virtually non-existent. Not only were
European governments particularly ill-prepared for such a large-scale
flow of refugees, but the burden created by the Russian refugee crisis
was further “magnified by the fact that Europe was drained by war:
stirred by political tensions; and exhausted of capacities to provide
adequate relief.” 103 The mass displacement of Russian refugees was
further exacerbated by the fact that the relatively free international
movement accorded to refugees during the 19th century had come to
an abrupt end following the conclusion of WWI. 104 In an effort to
tighten their borders and control the movements of refugees,
governments worldwide were adopting more guarded immigration
policies. 105
These movement restrictions had in fact begun in the United
States with the enactment of the 1921 and 1924 Immigration Acts,
which imposed the first numerical quotas on immigration to the United
100. Gilbert Jaeger, On the History of the International Protection of Refugees, 83 INT.
REV. RED CROSS 727, 727-36 (2001).
101. See generally CLAUDENA M. SKRAN, REFUGEES IN INTER-WAR EUROPE (1995);
Alessandra Roversi, The Evolution of the Refugee Regime and Institutional Responses: Legacies
from the Nansen Period, 22 REFUGEE SURV. Q. 21, 23 (2003).
102. SKRAN, supra note 101, at 33. However, it is noteworthy that estimates in relation to
this vary significantly. See DANIÈLE JOLY & CLIVE NETTLETON, REFUGEES IN EUROPE: THE
HOSTILE NEW AGENDA (1990); JOHN C. TORPEY, THE INVENTION OF THE PASSPORT:
SURVEILLANCE, CITIZENSHIP & THE STATE (2000); EVAN MAWDSLEY, THE RUSSIAN CIVIL
WAR (1987).
103. Roversi, supra note 101, at 23.
104. James C. Hathaway, The Evolution of Refugee Status in International Law: 19201950, 33(2) INT. & COMP. L. Q. 348, 348 (1984).
105. See id. at 348. See also SKRAN, supra note 101, at 22-23; see generally Louise W.
Holborn, The Legal Status of Political Refugees, 1920-1938, 32 AM. J. INT’L L. 680 (1938).
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States. 106 Not only were restrictions imposed on the number of persons
that the United States would accept, but it also set caps on the ethnic
origins of those allowed to enter. For example, under the Immigration
Act 1924, European immigration was limited to only 150,000 people
per year and favored certain European countries. For example, the
annual UK quota was 77,000 compared to the 2,300 cap set for persons
of Russian origin. 107 The increasing reluctance by governments to
admit refugees was a continuing obstacle for the refugee flows during
the inter-war period.
By late 1921, it was becoming increasingly clearer that
repatriation by the new soviet authorities would not be a tenable
solution. A 1921 decree had rendered those Russians who had fled the
revolution stateless, thus depriving them of their citizenship. 108 Even
in the event that such refugees could find a temporary place of asylum,
governments were reluctant to naturalize them and they were without
any internationally accepted travel documents to identify themselves
which would allow them to travel to other countries for safety or to
work. 109 As noted by Skran, “they lived as aliens in foreign lands, often
with an insecure legal status and subject to expulsion at a moment’s
notice.” 110 The lack of a secure legal identity and ability to travel was
the most significant problem faced by this group of refugees.
In response to the mass exodus of Russians, an appeal was made
by the International Red Cross Committee (“IRCC”), a voluntary
organization, to the League of Nations to deal with the “Russian
refugees scattered throughout Europe without legal protection or
representation.” 111 The League of Nations was an international, intergovernmental organization established in 1919 out of the Treaty of
Versailles112 with the primary purpose “to promote international cooperation and to achieve international peace and security” between
countries in the aftermath of WWI. 113 The League provided a forum
106. SKRAN, supra note 101, at 22.
107. Id.
108. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 351.
109. Id.
110. SKRAN, supra note 101, at 38.
111. League of Nations, Annex 1: Letter from the President of the Comité International
De La Croix-Rouge, 2 L.N.O.J. 227 (1921).
112. League of Nations, Covenant of the League of Nations, REFWORLD (Apr. 28, 1919),
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3dd8b9854.html [https://perma.cc/7DMB-QPJG].
113. Id.
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for its members to discuss and deal with a variety of social and political
problems, and was the first international organization that addressed
the refugee problem. 114
The IRCC had appealed to the Council of the League of Nations
on the basis that the need for action was an issue that went beyond
humanitarian duty but rather as “an obligation of international
justice,” 115 and that the League of Nations was “the only super national
political authority capable of solving a problem which is beyond the
power of exclusively humanitarian organization.” 116 The move by the
Red Cross to frame the refugee crisis in juridical and legal, rather than
strictly humanitarian terms, encouraged a positive response from the
Council which, after consulting with member governments, established
the Office of High Commissioner for Refugees in 1921. 117 This was the
first action that the League undertook on behalf of refugees.
Dr. Fridtjof Nansen was appointed as the first High Commissioner
on Behalf of the League in Connection with the Problems of Russian
Refugees in Europe.” 118 The High Commissioner’s mandate included
defining the legal status of Russian refugees, engaging in attempts to
organize their repatriation or alternatively facilitating their
employment opportunities outside of Russia and to coordinate
assistance and relief efforts. 119
The establishment of the inter-governmental League of Nations
and the appointment of the Refugee High Commissioner marked an
awareness by governments as to the need for an international response
to the refugee problem. It was also under the framework of the League
of Nations that a number of important legal international instruments
were developed in an attempt to afford some degree of protection and
rights to the refugees in inter-war Europe which subsequently marked
the beginnings of the inter-war era of legal refugee protection.
The High Commissioner had devoted particular attention to
securing the legal protection and status of refugees during his mandate.
114. For a historical overview of the creation of the League of Nations, see Claudena M.
Skran, Profiles of the First Two High Commissioners, 1 J. REFUGEE STUD. 277, 277 (1988).
115. League of Nations, supra note 111, at 227.
116. Id.
117. Skran, supra note 114, at 277.
118. Id.
119. Hathaway, supra note 104, at 351. For a detailed overview of the High Commissioner
period, see generally BRUNO CABANES, THE GREAT WAR AND THE ORIGINS OF
HUMANITARIANISM, 1918–1924 (2014).
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In July 1922, he convened an international conference in Geneva where
he put forward a proposal for internationally recognized identification
papers to be issued to Russian refugees. 120 This travel certificate—
which became known as the “Nansen Passport” 121 was subsequently
adopted under the Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates
of Identity to Russian Refugees (“1922 Arrangement”). 122 This was the
first international legal instrument addressing the legal protection of
refugees and as noted by Skran, “the beginning of international refugee
law can properly be dated to the creation of the Nansen passport
system.” 123 Although this was a non-binding agreement, it was
generally well-received with fifty-four signatory governments. 124
Under the terms of the 1922 Arrangement, governments could
issue Russian refugees living within their borders with legal identity
certificates, and renew these documents. Although the certificates were
not equivalent to a national passport, in that it did not grant citizenship
rights, or provide the right to return to the country of issue (unless there
was an express permission within), it did give refugees who were
effectively stateless somewhat a recognizable legal identity, and
allowed them to cross national borders and travel internationally more
freely in an attempt to resettle. 125 As noted above, this was one of the
key challenges faced by these refugees.
In 1924, the High Commissioner extended the issuance of the
certificates to approximately 320,000 Armenian refugees 126 who had
been displaced from the former Ottoman Empire under the 1924 Plan
for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees. 127 This
agreement essentially mimicked the 1922 Arrangement, providing

120. See generally Hathaway, supra note 104. See also SKRAN, supra note 101.
121. See generally Hathaway, supra note 104. See also SKRAN, supra note 101.
122. Arrangement with Regard to the Issue of Certificates of Identity to Russian Refugees,
July 5, 1922, 355 L.N.T.S. 238 (1922).
123. Skran, supra note 114, at 105. See also Russian Refugees: Report by Dr Nansen,
High Commissioner of the League of Nations, 8 L.N.O.J. 923, 927 (1922) (submitted to the
Council on July 20, 1922); LOUISE W HOLBORN, REFUGEES: A PROBLEM OF OUR TIME 10
(1975).
124. Hathaway, supra note 104; SKRAN, supra note 101.
125. Hathaway, supra note 104; SKRAN, supra note 101. See also Holborn, supra note
105, at 680, 684.
126. Hathaway, supra note 104.
127. League of Nations, Plan for the Issue of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian
Refugees, 5 L.N.O.J. 969–70 (May 31, 1924). See also SKRAN, supra note 101, at 106.
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refugees of Armenia with some form of legal recognition and the ability
to travel. 128
The subsequent 12 May 1926 Arrangement Relating to the Issue
of a Certificate of Identity to Armenian Refugees (“1926
Arrangement”) 129 made several improvements to these earlier
arrangements. The most significant among them was the inclusion of a
return clause to the identity certificates. As mentioned above, the
certificates at first were relatively limited, however the 1926
Arrangement recommended that the certificates make provision for a
return visa if the holder departed the country. Thus, governments would
undertake to re-admit the holder to the country of issue in an effort to
enable the “freedom of movement of the refugees.” 130 As a result, the
identity certificates increasingly became accepted as de facto
“passports.” 131
Significantly, the 1926 Arrangement was the first international
legal document to contain an explicit definition of a refugee. 132 Under
the earlier 1922 Arrangement and 1924 Plan, eligibility for the issuance
of an identity certificate was according to certain categories, that is
Russian or Armenian refugees, without any further elaboration. Thus,
the focus was simply on whether the person belonged to the relevant
ethnic group which presented challenges for the governments
administering the certificate system. The definitions in the 1926
Arrangement, which had been proposed by the High Commissioner,133
were relatively narrow. They continued to define a refugee according
to a particular country of origin, and the fundamental element was that
the refugee was deprived of the protection by the government in their
country of origin and had not acquired another nationality. 134
Nonetheless, the 1926 Arrangement became the first international legal
instrument to define a refugee. The definition was also eventually
adopted by the 1933 Convention Relating to the International Status of
128. See Hathaway, supra note 104, at 352.
129. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian
Refugees, May 12, 1926, 2004 L.N.T.S. 48 (1926).
130. Id. at provision 3.
131. See Holborn, supra note 105, at 685–86.
132. Arrangement Relating to the Issue of Identity Certificates to Russian and Armenian
Refugees, May 12, 1926, 2004 L.N.T.S. 48 (1926) [hereinafter 1926 Arrangement].
133. Report by the High Commissioner, League of Nations Doc. 1926.XLII.2 (1926), at
11 (as cited by Hathaway, supra note 104).
134. 1926 Arrangement, supra note 132.
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Refugees (“1933 Convention”), 135 however it was not without
criticism, particularly for the lack of scope and emphasis on a lack of
diplomatic protection in the definition. 136
At a 1928 intergovernmental conference on refugees, the scope
and legal protections afforded under the Nansen certificate system was
extended by the League of Nations to other categories of refugees who
were living in similar conditions as the Russian and Armenian refugees
under the 30 June 1928 Arrangement Concerning the Extension to
Other Categories of Refugees of Certain Measures taken in favour of
Russian and Armenian Refugees. 137 This included those of Assyrian
origin, Assyro-Chaldean persons of Syrian or Kurdish origin as well as
persons of Turkish origin 138 Thus, this continued to emphasize the ad
hoc, category-oriented approach of classifying refugees according to
country of origin or group affiliation that was dominant during this
period, seeking to limit their commitments to known categories and
staying away from any general description of unknown quantity.
A second agreement that was concluded under the League of
Nations, following the 1928 intergovernmental conference, was the
1928 Arrangement Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and
Armenian Refugees (“1928 Arrangement”). 139 This arrangement was
effectively an enhanced arrangement on the legal status of Russian and
Armenian refugees, however it differed markedly from the earlier
arrangement with regard to one fundamental aspect. The arrangement
marked the League’s first attempt to confer a range of rights to
refugees—this included the recognition of the refugees’ personal
status, including divorce and marriage rights, and contained other
favorable treatment including rights to work, protection against
expulsion, and equality in taxation. Notably, the arrangements prior to
1928 did not establish any specific responsibilities for states other than
co-operation in the recognition of League of Nations documentation.140
135. Convention Relating to the International Status of Refugees, Oct. 28, 1933, 159
L.N.T.S 199 (1933) [hereinafter 1933 Convention].
136. See Claudera M. Skran, Historical Development of International Refugee Law, in
THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 3,
35 (Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner & Felix Machts eds., 2011).
137. Arrangement Concerning the Extension to Other Categories of Refugee of Certain
Measures Taken in Favour of Russian and Armenian Refugees, June 30, 1928, 89 L.N.T.S. 65
(1928) [hereinafter 1928 Arrangement].
138. Id.
139. 1928 Arrangement, supra note 137.
140. See JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW
86 (2005).
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The standards contained within the 1928 Arrangement lacked the
status of treaty law and therefore were not legally binding. They were
simply recommendations and ultimately reliance on goodwill to deal
with the mass population flows was insufficient. By the 1930s,
governments were plagued with enormous political and economic
instability, and thus had become increasingly unwilling to accept many
of the defined categories of refugees under these arrangements. In an
attempt to preserve any entitlements for their own citizens, particularly
those relating to the work force, governments began promulgating laws
unfavorable to refugees, particularly dealing with limits on foreign
workers and further restricting their immigration and asylum laws. 141
B. The 1933 Refugee Convention
By the late 1920s, the refugee problem was heightened following
a continuous series of refugee flows throughout Europe and a
heightened reluctance by refugees and host governments to mass
naturalizations. 142 It had also become clear that these earlier ad hoc
arrangements were not satisfactory in addressing or providing legal
protection to address the ongoing mass movements of refugees. As
noted in a Secretariat memorandum, “with the exception of the Nansen
passport, the existing so-called arrangements are producing practically
no effect upon the position of the refugees.” 143
A number of recommendations had been put forward to consider
creating a formal international legal document with a convention
foundation on the basis that it would be the best means of securing a
more permanent solution to the protection of refugees. 144 In 1933, the
League of Nations formally called for a refugee convention and a draft

141. Id. at 86–87. See also SKRAN, supra note 101, at 123–24.
142. League of Nations, Report of the Advisory Commission to the HC for Russian,
Armenian, Assyrian, Assyro-chaldean and Turkish Refugees, League of Nations Doc.
C.210.1929. VII (1929); reprinted in League of Nations, Russian, Armenian, Assyrian, Assyrochaldean, and Turkish Refugees: Report to the Tenth Assembly, August 15, 1929, League of
Nations Doc. A.23.1929.VII (1929), at 1.
143. Secretariat memorandum of Feb. 3, 1933, LNA R5614/686. See also SKRAN, supra
note 101, at 124.
144. See Skran, supra note 114. See also League of Nations, Work of the Intergovernmental Advisory Commission for Refugees During its Fifth Session and Communication
from the International Nansen Office for Refugees, 5(1) LN OJ 854 (1933), at 855 (as cited by
HATHAWAY, supra note 140, at 87).
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was submitted at an intergovernmental conference in Geneva that
year. 145
The outcome of the conference was the 1933 Convention,146
which fully came into force on June 13, 1935. As noted by Louise
Holborn, the Convention represented a “new stage in the efforts to
achieve an international legal status for refugees by putting forward a
set of rules governing important aspects of the refugee problem.”147
The Convention was applicable to Russian, Armenian, Assyrian,
Assyro-Chaldean, and Turkish refugees—adopting the narrow
definitions set out in the 1926 and 1928 Arrangements which greatly
limited the ambit of protection provided for in the Convention. 148 By
the adoption of these definitions, it is clear that the Convention was
designed to deal with refugees already under the assistance of the
League of Nations, specifically the Nansen International Office which
had been set up in 1930 following the death of the High Commissioner,
and its purpose was not to aid refugees in a broader sense.
The Convention guaranteed these refugees a broad range of basic
civil, political, and economic rights. These included rights in respect of
identity certificates, education, labor conditions, taxation, expulsion,
social welfare, and access to courts. 149 Moreover, there was an
emphasis on promoting the principle of equal treatment of refugees by
governments. As highlighted by Hathaway, “it is noteworthy however,
that the 1933 convention guaranteed almost all refugee rights either
absolutely or on terms of equivalency with the citizens of mostfavoured states.” 150 Thus, the 1933 Convention placed particular
emphasis on promoting the concept of equal/same treatment that
governments should accord to all refugees. However, the drafters
seemed to merely be consolidating earlier practices as many of these
rights guaranteed in the Convention simply formalized or enhanced
those in the 1928 Arrangement. 151

145. See Skran, supra note 114.
146. 1933 Convention, supra note 130.
147. Holborn, supra note 105. See also SKRAN, supra note 101, at 129.
148. Article 1 of the 1933 Convention states that it applicable to “Russian, Armenian, and
assimilated refugees, as defined by the Arrangement of 12 May 1926, and 30 June 1928.”
149. For a detailed discussion on the rights and standards set out under the 1933
Convention, see SKRAN, supra note 101, at 125–29; HATHAWAY, supra note 140.
150. HATHAWAY, supra note 140, at 88.
151. Id.
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Importantly, the Convention was the first instrument to set a
binding obligation on signatory states in relation to expulsion and the
non-refoulement of refugees, 152 which became an increasingly
common practice during the 1930s. 153 This principle means that
governments should not expel or involuntarily return a refugee to not
only their country of origin, but any country against their will if there
is a risk of persecution—this includes the refusal to admit someone at
the frontier. The right to non-refoulement is considered to be
fundamental to modern international refugee law.
Ultimately, only eight states formally ratified and applied the
provisions of the treaty, however many did so with reservations. 154 The
small number of ratifications coupled with the fact that it only applied
to certain refugee groups as a result of the narrow definition it had
adopted of a refugee meant that it had very little practical impact.155
Nonetheless, the 1933 Convention marked a significant milestone in
the history of the international refugee regime. It was the first legally
binding comprehensive instrument addressing the legal protection and
standard of conduct to be accorded to refugees. It is also significant
because it served as the foundation of the 1951 Refugee Convention.
This is perhaps the most important contribution that the 1933
Convention has made to modern international refugee law.
In response to a number of specific world events between 1936
and the adoption of the current refugee convention, a number of ad hoc
treaties and intergovernmental agreements were formulated in an
attempt to provide some measure of protection to the affected
refugees. 156 This was driven by the emerging crisis caused by displaced
German refugees after National Socialism came to power in Germany.
Although these documents were not a comprehensive approach to the
refugee issues at the time, they demonstrated an awareness by
152. 1933 Convention, supra note 130, art. 3. Although the obligation not to expel and to
avoid refoulement of Armenian and Russian refugees was first set out in the 1928 Arrangement
Relating to the Legal Status of Russian and Armenian Refugees, this obligation was in the form
of non-binding recommendations. See also SKRAN, supra note 101, at 131.
153. League of Nations, NIO, Discussion du rapport du Counseil d’administration, LNOJ
Special Suppl. No. 109, at 16, 17.
154. See SKRAN, supra note 101, at 129; HATHAWAY, supra note 140, at 88.
155. See SKRAN, supra note 101, at 129; HATHAWAY, supra note 140, at 88.
156. See generally SKRAN, supra note 101; HATHAWAY, supra note 140. This includes
two international treaties concluded under the League of Nations concerning the protection of
refugees from Germany - the 1936 Provisional Arrangement Concerning the Status of Refugees
Coming From Germany (1936 Provisional Arrangement) and the 1938 Convention Concerning
the Status of Refugees Coming From Germany.
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governments of the international nature of the refugee problem, and
that refugees were a special category of migrants who deserved special
attention and should not be sent back to a country of persecution. They
established important principles that would later be included in the
Convention.
C. Refugee Law Following the Second World War
The years that followed were dominated by dire economic events
and the outbreak of further violent conflicts, dampening the possibility
of any further ratifications by states to the Convention. In particular,
the Second World War marked a new era of mass exodus for millions
of people. When the war ended in 1945, there were more than 40
million displaced people who were reluctant or could not return home
because of border changes—constituting the largest group displaced in
history. 157
In 1943, prior to the beginning of the war, the United Nations
Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (“UNRRA”) was established
which relied on cooperation and charitable funding by governments.
Although it was not created principally as a refugee organization, it had
a wide-ranging mandate to address the massive groups of refugees
following the upheaval of WWII. This included measures for providing
relief and an attempt to repatriate those had been displaced as well as
assisting with the rehabilitation of war-torn European nations. 158
Following the conclusion of the war, the UNRRA assisted with
the repatriation of approximately 7 million people. 159 However, the
mandate of the UNRAA was not extended past 1947 after its
repatriation and rehabilitation efforts were effectively hampered due to
Cold War tension and opposition from the Soviet Union. 160 Further, the
US Government, who were responsible for providing the majority of
the UNRRA’s funding, refused to grant any further financial aid to the

157. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), THE STATE OF
THE WORLD’S REFUGEES 2000: FIFTY YEARS OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION (2000), available at

http://www.unhcr.org/en-au/publications/sowr/4a4c754a9/state-worlds-refugees-2000-fiftyyears-humanitarian-action.html [https://perma.cc/94MY-VE56] [hereinafter UNHCR, THE
STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES].
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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organization, effectively vetoing the extension of its mandate. 161 This
was largely due to the US Government’s preference to replace the
UNRRA with an international body with a more wide-ranging capacity
of operations and authority to deal with the protection of refugees
displaced in the aftermath of the war. 162
Subsequently, the International Refugee Organization (“IRO”)
was created in 1947 by a resolution of the recently established United
Nations General Assembly. 163 The IRO was initially established as a
non-permanent specialized intergovernmental agency of the United
Nations primarily tasked with providing relief, repatriation,
resettlement, and protection of refugees displaced within Europe.164
However, unlike the UNRRA, its efforts focused on the resettlement of
refugees as opposed to their repatriation. 165 Although its work was
restricted to assisting displaced European refugees, the IRO was the
first international refugee body to fully address all issues arising from
the refugee crisis. 166 Ultimately, the IRO’s activities formally ceased in
1952 as a result of its inability to bring the refugee crisis to an end with
masses of people still adrift in Europe. 167 The IRO was the last refugee
organization to precede the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. 168 It was primarily concerned with offering material
assistance and making attempts to repatriate or resettle displaced
persons. 169
D. The 1951 Refugee Convention
By 1950, the international community recognized that the refugee
problem sparked by the Second World War was not a temporary one.
A more durable solution was necessary, especially given that there was
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. See also Hathaway, supra note 104, at 372–73.
UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES, supra note 157.
Id.; Hathaway, supra note 104, at 374.
UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES, supra note 157.
Id.
Id.
LOUISE W. HOLBORN, THE INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE ORGANIZATION, A
SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF THE UNITED NATIONS: ITS HISTORY AND WORK, 1946-1952, 29-30
(1956).
168. See infra Section III.E.
169. See Terje Einarsen, Drafting History of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol,
in THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL A
COMMENTARY 45-46 (Andreas Zimmermann, Jonas Dörschner (asst.) & Felix Machts (asst.)
eds., 2011).
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no obligation at the time on states to assist refugees. The only
agreements providing for refugee protection in place were those
formulated under the League of Nations and created in response to
specific events that triggered significant refugee movements. 170 Thus,
it was recognized that an instrument with a broader approach would be
more effective at addressing the ongoing refugee problems.
The intent of the drafters of this instrument was to revise and
consolidate the earlier refugee agreements, and to extend their scope of
protection. 171 Specifically, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status
of Refugees was drafted in response to the problems confronting the
international community as a result of the mass displacement of people
from Europe following World War II. 172 The Convention was also
viewed as necessary to encourage a more equal sharing of
responsibility for refugees through the implementation of binding
obligations. 173
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees was adopted
on July 28, 1951, and came into force on April 22, 1954. 174 The
Convention was drafted by a combination of United Nations organs, ad
hoc committees and a conference of plenipotentiaries with the intent of
ensuring that states could not again turn their backs on vulnerable
groups escaping persecution and purported to provide a guarantee of
non-refoulement. 175 The Refugee Convention was the first and remains
the only binding refugee protection instrument of a universal character
and has become the foundation of the international refugee protection
regime post WWII.
The definition of refugee adopted by the Refugee Convention was
restricted to those persons who had become displaced as a result of
“events occurring in Europe before 1 January 1951” and who were
unwilling or unable to return to their country of origin because of a

170. See Part III for its discussion.
171. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 99, at preamble.
172. Id.
173. Id. at preamble. As noted in the preamble of the Convention “the grant of asylum
may place unduly heavy burdens on certain countries, and that a satisfactory solution of a
problem of which the United Nations has recognized the international scope and nature cannot
therefore be achieved without international co-operation[.]”
174. Id.
175. See generally JAMES C. HATHAWAY & MICHELLE FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE
STATUS (2d ed. 2014).
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well-founded fear of being persecuted for one of five reasons. 176 It also
allowed signatory states to elect to limit their obligations to refugees
originating from “events occurring within Europe.” 177 Thus, these
limitations make it clear that the Refugee Convention was originally
drafted with the political goal of directly responding to and assisting
displaced European refugees who had been affected by the Second
World War. 178
However, in recognition of the continuing displacement of
persons across different parts of the world following events unrelated
to WWII, the Convention was subject to an amendment by the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”). 179 The
Protocol entered into force on October 4, 1967 and is a separate
instrument from the 1951 Refugee Convention. Further, accession to it
is not limited to those states already party to the 1951 Refugee
Convention. The Protocol did not change the refugee definition in any
material way other than by removing the abovementioned temporal and
geographical limitations, thereby strengthening the protection of
refugees. Article 1.2 of the Protocol states “[f]or the purpose of the
present protocol, the term ‘refugee’ shall . . . mean any person within
the definition of Article 1 of the convention.”
Article 1A(2) of the Convention, as amended by the 1967
Protocol, mandates that refugee status be granted to:
any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear of being
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership
of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country.

Thus, as the Refugee Convention stands today, the rights and
protections conferred by the Convention are extended to all refugees,
and not just those affected by pre-1951 events in Europe. 180 Moreover,
the 1967 Protocol did not broaden rights under the Convention, but
simply incorporated them by reference under Article 1(1). Thus, in
effect, the aim of the amendment was to expand the scope of the

176. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 94, art. 1A, (amended by G.A. Res. 2198 (xxi),
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1 (Jan. 31, 1967) [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
177. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 99, art. 1B.
178. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175.
179. 1967 Protocol, supra note 176.
180. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175, at 10.

534

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:3

Convention and allow for the universal coverage and protection of
refugees.
However, the Convention definition only applies to specific types
of displaced people. In other words, to qualify for refugee status, an
individual must have a well-grounded basis for fearing persecution in
their homeland. The basis for persecution is not generic. It can only be
for one of five designated reasons. These are race, religion, nationality,
political group, or membership in a particular social group. In addition
to this, in order for the Refugee Convention to be applicable, the
individual must be outside of their country of origin and unable or
unwilling to return. These limitations are significant. For example, if a
person is outside their country of origin and is almost certain to be
killed if they return to their country of origin because, for example, a
generalized wide-ranging conflict or they are being targeted by
powerful criminal gangs or corrupt government officials, they are not
entitled to invoke the Refugee Convention.
Importantly, the 1951 Convention continues to provide the
guarantee of non-refoulement under Article 33. According to this
principle, a refugee cannot be expelled or returned to a country where
they may be subject to persecution on account of their race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion. 181 However, this right is not conferred upon refugees
reasonably regarded as posing a risk to national security or considered
a danger to the community. 182 The Convention extends a number of
other rights to refugees. For example, refugees are entitled to the same
rights as citizens in relation to freedom of religion, intellectual
property, access to courts and legal assistance, accessing elementary
education, labor rights, and social security. 183
As at August 2019, the total number of states party to the 1951
Convention is 145 and those party to the 1967 Protocol is 146. 184 The
number of states parties to both the Convention and Protocol stands at
142. 185 There are also three countries (including the United States)
which have agreed to the Protocol only, and two small countries that
have agreed to the Convention only. 186 The Refugee Convention has
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 99, art. 33(1).
Id. art. 33(2).
Id. arts. 4, 14, 16, 22, and 24.
UNHCR, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
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been responsible for settling more displaced people than any other
international instrument. Thus, despite the somewhat arbitrary limits
imposed in the Convention, it has proven to be an incredibly successful
platform upon which resettlement has occurred for millions of asylum
seekers.
E. The Role of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR)
The UNHCR, replacing the IRO, was established by the UN
General Assembly with a three-year mandate beginning January 1,
1951. 187 It was initially tasked with the goal of providing protection
and establishing permanent solutions to deal with the refugee crisis.188
As mandated under Article 2 of the UNHCR Statute, the work of the
High Commissioner “shall be of an entirely non-political character; it
shall be humanitarian and social and shall relate, as a rule, to groups
and categories of refugees.” 189
UNHCR’s mandate and operations were repeatedly renewed to
address the ongoing refugee movements. 190 However, in 2003 the UN
General Assembly converted the UNHCR into a permanent
independent agency. 191
It is also important to note that the Refugee Convention and
UNHCR mandate were drafted at the same time. Thus, the framework
of the UNHCR was very much built upon and centered around the
intentions reflected in the Convention—mainly to supervise its
application by signatory states 192 and to assist and seek protection for
the European refugees displaced in the aftermath of WWII. 193
However, as refugee movements became larger and more complex, the
Convention refugee definition presented significant limitations on the
scope and activities of the UNHCR. In response, the mandate of the
UNHCR was extended by the UN General Assembly to not only assist
and monitor refugees but also displaced persons who fell outside the

187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.
193.

UNHCR, THE STATE OF THE WORLD’S REFUGEES, supra note 157, at 19.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 19.
Id. at 14.
Id. at 14.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 99, art. 35.
Id.
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scope of the Refugee Convention. 194 Although the Convention
definition itself was not broadened, the UNHCR’s mandate was
broadened to provide assistance to a number of other categories of
persons it considers to be of concern. 195 This includes internally
displaced persons, stateless persons, asylum-seekers and also
returnees. 196
From a staff of thirty-four at the time of its founding, UNHCR
now employs 16,803 staff as at May 31, 2019. The agency is active in
over 134 countries and its budget has grown from US$300,000 in its
first year to more than US$1 billion in the early 1990s and reached a
new annual high of US$8.6 billion in 2019—funded almost entirely by
voluntary contributions. 197
F. Summary of International Refugee Instruments
The above discussion shows that mass people movements are not
new. There have been several large waves of displaced people
throughout the twentieth century. On each occasion, countries that
were affected by these movements found tenable solutions to deal with
the problem. At times, the solutions were ad hoc while more recently
they were more wide-ranging. However, none of the solutions were
perfect and did not involve receiving countries assuming legally
enforceable obligations to accept displaced people. The world is
currently experiencing an unprecedented problem associated with the
forced movement of people. Unlike previous scenarios, there seems to
be very little appetite by sovereign states to increase their intake of
displaced people. It does not seem tenable that a new or novel
agreement or arrangement will be reached which will foreseeably
resolve or significantly assist the current displaced people crisis. To the
extent that some nations were willing to absorb significantly increased
numbers of displaced people, this approach seems to have irretrievably
stalled. This is highlighted by the reversal in the approach by Germany
194. 1967 Protocol, supra note 176.
195. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), UNHCR RESETTLEMENT
HANDBOOK: DIVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 11 (rev. Jul. 2011), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/46f7c0ee2.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z4W9-7XLT].
196. Id. at 18.
197. See U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Figures at a Glance, UNHCR,
https://www.unhcr.org/en-au/figures-at-a-glance.html [https://perma.cc/9AQR-ECT4] (last
visited Feb. 6, 2020).

2020]

THE REFUGEES CONVENTION

537

to admitting displaced people. 198 In light of that, part of the solution
may involve a more expansive interpretation of the existing Refugee
Convention and it is to that that the Author now turns.
IV. THE MEANING OF POLITICAL OPINION IN A NUMBER OF
REFUGEE COUNTRIES
A. Overview of Meaning of Political Opinion
Political opinion is one of the five persecution grounds as set out
in Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention. It states:
For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘refugee’
shall apply to any person who:
(2) . . . owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality
and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to return to it.

The meaning of this ground is nebulous. There is no uniform or
consistent approach that has been taken to its meaning or scope. The
difficulty in achieving a clear and definitive interpretation can be seen
across all jurisdictions, with interpretative inconsistencies arising from
both within and among jurisdictions. The manner in which it is
interpreted can have significant consequences for the capacity of
displaced people to obtain asylum in a country outside of their own,
and also for the obligations of states to absorb refugees within their
borders.
One reason for the uncertainty regarding the meaning of political
opinion is the absence of interpretative guidance provided within the
Refugee Convention itself. The Refugee Convention does not in any
way attempt to expressly define the ground nor does it contain any
examples of the types of opinions that may constitute political opinion
within the meaning of Article 1A(2).
The guidance provided by the travaux preparatoires of the
Refugee Convention in ascertaining the meaning of political opinion is
198. See supra Part II.D.
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also particularly limited. Reference to these working papers indicate
that the drafters of the Convention intended that the ground be
interpreted and applied in an expansive manner to encompass
“diplomats thrown out of office,” persons “whose political party had
been outlawed”, and “individuals who fled from revolution.” 199 In
other words, protection under this ground should be not be restricted to
persons that have an obvious association to a political party or who
adhere to a formal political ideology. 200
The UNHCR Handbook, 201 although not legally binding, has long
been recognized as a leading source of guidance in interpreting and
applying the Refugee Convention and Protocol. The Handbook, which
was republished in 2019, provides the following guidance as to
ascertaining the boundaries of the ground:
Holding political opinions different from those of the Government
is not in itself a ground for claiming refugee status, and an
applicant must show that he has a fear of persecution for holding
such opinions. This presupposes that the applicant holds opinions
not tolerated by the authorities, which are critical of their policies
or methods. It also presupposes that such opinions have come to
the notice of the authorities or are attributed by them to the
applicant. 202

Further, the Handbook explicitly recognizes that a person may
still qualify for asylum under this ground on the basis of an unexpressed
political opinion. It states:
As indicated above, persecution “for reasons of political opinion”
implies that an applicant holds an opinion that either has been
expressed or has come to the attention of the authorities. There
may, however, also be situations in which the applicant has not
given any expression to his opinions. Due to the strength of his
convictions, however, it may be reasonable to assume that his
opinions will sooner or later find expression and that the applicant

200. See also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on International
Protection No. 10, §51, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/13/10 (Nov. 12, 2014) (“The political opinion
ground is broader than affiliation with a particular political movement or ideology . . .”).
201. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND
CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS AND GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE
STATUS OF REFUGEES, HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV. 4 (reissued 2019) [hereinafter UNHCR,
HANDBOOK].
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will, as a result, come into conflict with the authorities. Where this
can reasonably be assumed, the applicant can be considered to
have fear of persecution for reasons of political opinion.
An applicant claiming fear of persecution because of political
opinion need not show that the authorities of his country of origin
knew of his opinions before he left the country. He may have
concealed his political opinion and never have suffered any
discrimination or persecution. However, the mere fact of refusing
to avail himself of the protection of his Government, or a refusal
to return, may disclose the applicant’s true state of mind and give
rise to fear of persecution. In such circumstances the test of wellfounded fear would be based on an assessment of the
consequences that an applicant having certain political
dispositions would have to face if he returned. This applies
particularly to the so-called refugee “sur place.” 203

The UNHCR has also adopted the somewhat liberal interpretation
by Goodwin-Gill, who states that the expression “political opinion:”
Should be understood in the broad sense to incorporate, within
substantive limitations now developing generally in the field of
human rights, any opinion or any matter in which the machinery
of the state, government and policy may be engaged. 204

This definition has been a central pillar in the analysis of this
ground. The only court to have explicitly adopted the Goodwin-Gill
interpretation is the Supreme Court of Canada. 205 In contrast, a NZ
tribunal has found that this definition was “too broad to be of any
meaningful assistance.” 206 Ultimately, the courts have disagreed on the
outer limits of the ground and this notion of breadth creates a tension
for decision makers who are cautious so as to not “open the flood-gates
of asylum.” 207
In fact, there are only a handful of decisions in which courts have
attempted to precisely define or set out a definitive approach to
203. Id.
204. For example, see U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidelines on
International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the Context of Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, ¶ 32,
HCR/GIP/02/01 (May 7, 2002), and also U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees (UNHCR), Guidance
Note on Refugee Claims Relating to Victims of Organized Gangs, ¶ 45, (Mar. 31, 2010),
available at https://www.refworld.org/docid/4bb21fa02.html [https://perma.cc/RK8X-E6AG].
205. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 746 (Can.).
206. Refugee Appeal No. 76339 [2010] NZAR 386 (N.Z. R.S.A.A.).
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interpreting this ground. The case law that does exist has contributed
little to the analysis, rather it merely adds to the uncertainty, with a
number of different approaches emerging. As noted by Hathaway and
Foster in Law of Refugee Status:
Among those acts that have been construed as expressions of
political opinion are public statements regarding the unfair
distribution of food in Iraq, a public accusation of judicial
ineptness where such conduct was considered “anti-Islamic,”
attempts by a Guatemalan literacy teacher to educate the
population, the preparedness of a Sinhalese travel agent to engage
in business with Tamil clients, the supply of business services to
governmental and military institutions, employment by political
figures including the government, actual, imputed, or implied
advocacy of human rights, including labor rights, undertaking
humanitarian work, defection from the KGB, illegal departure or
stay abroad, the lodgment of a (failed) claim for refugee status
abroad, and violation of a politically motivated criminal law. Even
the refusal to declare a political opinion – in other words a position
of neutrality – might lead to an imputation of a political opinion.208

These examples of qualifying political opinions are inherently
conflicting and when considered as a whole illustrates the extent to
which the interpretations of this ground are unclear in the absence of
an authoritative definition and has led to an open-ended analysis.
Broadly however, it is settled law among major common law
countries—the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, and Australia
that “the Convention speaks not of political activities but of political
opinions” 209—which is inherently much broader. This is in line with
the views of the UNHCR above. Thus, the opinion does not necessarily
need to be expressed or acted upon prior to their departure to be eligible
for protection. 210 There may be various reasons why a person has not
expressed their political opinion. For example, it may have been

208. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175, at 413-15 (citations omitted).
209. See Juan Alejandra Araya Heredio cited in id. at 409-23. This principle has been
endorsed in Australian cases, see V v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999)
92 FCR 355 [hereinafter V v. Minister]; and within Canadian jurisprudence, see Canada
(Attorney General) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689.
210. See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175, at 409-23; GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL &
JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 89, 104 (3d ed. 2007).
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practically impossible to express a non-conforming political opinion
while in the home state and great risks associated with that. 211
Moreover, an applicant for refugee status does not even need to
hold the opinion that has created the risk of persecution. It is widely
accepted that a political asylum claim can be grounded on the basis of
an opinion that has been attributed to the applicant, even if that opinion
has been falsely attributed. This is known as the imputed political
opinion doctrine. 212 For example, an opinion may be attributed to an
applicant based on their past association, family ties, or social class.
The question in such cases is whether the persecutor views the person
as holding a political opinion. Given that in most imputed political
claims there will be no direct evidence, it will be up to the decision
maker to speculate about the persecutor’s perceptions. This presents
problems in itself and the case law highlights a vastly varied approach
by decision makers in their attitude towards imputing a political
opinion.
In either case, whether the refugee claim is based on an actual or
imputed opinion, the decision maker must decide whether there is
reason to believe that the holding or attribution of such opinion will
place them in jeopardy upon return to their home state. 213 Thus, for
asylum purposes, the Convention requires a forward-looking
assessment of the risk. Both the UNHCR and courts have generally
held that to satisfy this requirement, the persecutor must be on notice
of an applicant’s alleged opinion, and the persecutor is not willing to
tolerate the applicant’s political opinion. 214 In other terms, the opinion
must be discernable in some way, otherwise, there is no basis on which
a potential persecutor could possibly form a view. The situation
therefore is clearest where there has been some action consistent with
that opinion.
Moreover, not every opinion will create a risk of persecution and
therefore qualify for protection. The opinion must be political in nature.
The notion of opinion has not caused any controversy or generated any
analysis. In contrast, decision makers have extensively grappled with
what ought to be considered political in the context of the Refugee
Convention.

211.
212.
213.
214.

See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175, at 409-23.
Id.
See HATHAWAY & FOSTER, supra note 175 at 409-23.
See UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supra note 201 at 14.
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The application of political opinion is particularly straight
forward when there has been an opinion that has been expressed in an
overt manner and it concerns formal political structures, such as the
government of the day or some other element regarding the state.
However, as is clear through recent jurisprudence, many political
opinion claims do not fit within these parameters.
There have been a number of trouble spots that have arisen in this
context. For example, one of the most troublesome issues is the
widespread disagreement among decision makers about whether or not
political opinion should be defined by reference to an engagement with
the government or the state—as per the Guy Goodwin-Gill
definition.215 Another complexity that has arisen is whether refusing to
hold a political opinion comes within the scope of the ground. The
complexities underpinning this area of law are now fleshed out more
fully in the context of examining the relevant jurisprudence in leading
refugee law jurisdictions.
B. United States
The Refugee Convention definition was first codified in domestic
United States law under the Refugee Act of 1980, 216 described as “the
most comprehensive US law ever enacted concerning refugee
admissions and resettlement.” 217 The Act intended to ensure US
immigration law was consistent with its rights and obligations under
the Refugee Convention and as such incorporated a new definition of
the term refugee that was in line with the Convention definition.218 The
Refugee Act modified the 1952 US Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) by codifying the definition of a refugee. It defines a refugee
as a person who is “outside the United States and is unable or unwilling
to return to his or her country of origin because of persecution or a well215. It appears that such a connection to the government, policy or the state is required by
the majority in Immigration & Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992),
whereas in Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.) it is not a
requirement.
216. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96 – 212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980). The United States
did not sign the Refugee Convention. However, it adopted the obligations under the Refugee
Convention by accession to the 1967 Protocol. The 1967 Protocol explicitly incorporated the
convention refugee definition.
217. Arnold H. Leibowitz, The Refugee Act of 1980: Problems and Congressional
Concerns, 467 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 163, 164 (1983).
218. Refugee Act of 1980, supra note 216.
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founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” 219
Political opinion is not defined under the INA. Further, as was the
case with the legislative history of the Convention, the US Congress
did not provide any guidance as to the meaning intended to attach to
the political opinion ground. As a result of this, the meaning of political
opinion in the US context has been given shape through determinations
by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) and US courts. There
has been no clear interpretation of the ground, with a number of
divergent approaches emerging at each level. There are diverging
standards as to what the applicant must satisfy which has resulted in a
body of asylum law that is difficult to reconcile and inconsistent.
US courts have unambiguously recognized claims which involve
the overt expression of an opinion and that has been tied to a formal
political party or ideology. For example, where the opinion has been
evidenced through organizational membership, including association
with a dissident party and related organizations, and memberships in
organizations that promote social, cultural, economic, or political
rights, such as labor unions. 220 These claims are generally
uncontroversial and do not result in much analysis.
However, US courts have been reluctant to grant asylum in
circumstances where there is no cognizable political opinion. That is,
where the asylum seeker can show no overt manifestation of such
opinion. This has commonly arisen in the context of forced recruitment
by gangs, in which case the principle question is whether the refusal to
engage in combat constitutes a political choice for neutrality.
In the seminal political asylum case of Immigration &
Naturalization Service v. Elias-Zacarias, 221 the US Supreme Court was
faced with this issue. Notably, the Court did not embark on any attempt
to ascertain the meaning and scope of political opinion and in the
absence of a formal definition, the decision has generated an unclear
and conflicting body of political asylum jurisprudence. In that case, the
applicant (Elias-Zacarias) had sought asylum in the United States after
an anti-government guerrilla organization in Guatemala unsuccessfully
219. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82 – 414, § 101(a)(42)(A), 66
Stat. 163.
220. See, e.g., Sharma v. Holder, 729 F.3d 407, 412–13 (5th Cir. 2013) and Sobaleva v.
Holder, 760 F.3d 592, 594 (7th Cir. 2014).
221. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 478 (1991).
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attempted to recruit him to join them in their war against the
Government. Elias-Zacarias supported neither side in the conflict and
subsequently fled to the United States believing that the guerrillas
would retaliate against him for his refusal to join them, in an attempt to
remain neutral. 222 The Ninth Circuit court’s ruling in favor of EliasZacarias was reversed in a 6-3 majority decision by the Supreme Court.
The question before the Court was whether the forced participation in
a guerilla organization constituted “persecution on account of. . .
political opinion.” 223
On the issue of whether neutrality qualifies as a basis for political
asylum under the Refugee Act, Justice Scalia, writing for the majority
stated that it is “not ordinarily” an “affirmative expression of a political
opinion.” 224 The Court did not meaningfully elaborate on this. Despite
leaving this question open, Justice Scalia went on to inquire into EliasZacarias’ motivation for refusing recruitment. According to the Court,
even if Elias-Zacarias’ refusal did constitute an affirmative expression
of his neutrality, it must have been politically motivated. The Court
reasoned that “even a person who supports a guerrilla movement might
resist recruitment for a variety of reasons-fear of combat, a desire to
remain with one’s family and friends, a desire to earn a better living in
civilian life, to mention only a few.” 225 Because Elias-Zacarias had
testified that he was “afraid that the government would retaliate against
him and his family if he did join the guerrillas” this evinced the
“opposite” of a political motive on his part. 226
This is in stark contrast to the position taken by the 9th Circuit,
who prior to this decision, had held that it was improper to examine the
applicant’s motives in holding their belief:
We have several reasons for reaching the conclusion that the
government may not look behind the manifestation of an alien’s
political opinion and seek to determine why he made a particular
political choice. First, it is simply improper for the government to
inquire into the motives underlying an individual’s political
decisions. Second, the motives frequently will be both complex
222. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S at 479–80.
223. Id. at 478.
224. The Ninth Circuit, ruling in favor of Elias, held that the act of resisting forced
recruitment is the expression of a qualifying political opinion that is hostile to the persecutor and
therefore is a qualifying political opinion under the Refugee Act - Zacarias v. United States
I.N.S., 921 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1990).
225. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
226. Id. at 480.
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and difficult to ascertain; it may not be possible to separate the
political from the non-political aspects. What standards would we
use, for example, to determine whether a choice was sufficiently
based on political principles or whether economic self-interest was
the determinative factor? Third, and perhaps most important, it is
irrelevant why the individual made his choice. It does not matter
to the persecutors what the individual’s motivation is. The
guerrillas in El Salvador do not inquire into the reasoning process
of those who insist on remaining neutral and refuse to join their
cause. They are concerned only with an act that constitutes an
overt manifestation of a political opinion. Persecution because of
that overt manifestation is persecution because of a political
opinion.” 227

Justice Stevens (who was joined by Justices Blackmun and
O’Connor) in his dissent, criticized the majority for their “narrow” and
“grudging” opinion. According to Stevens, “a political opinion can be
expressed negatively as well as affirmatively” and therefore EliasZacarias’ refusal did constitute a political expression that would qualify
under the ground. Moreover, his opinion was not any less political
because it was motivated by fear. 228 As explained by Stevens, “even if
the refusal is motivated by nothing more than a simple desire to
continue living an ordinary life with one’s family, it is the kind of
political expression that the asylum provisions of the statute were
intended to protect.” 229
Ultimately, Justice Scalia did not feel compelled to decide
whether Elias-Zacarias did in fact hold a political opinion because even
if he did, he failed to establish that he had “a ‘well-founded fear that
. . . on account of that opinion.” 230 According to Justice Scalia,
“persecution on account of . . . political opinion’ in § 101(a)(42) is
persecution on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the
persecutor’s.” 231 He arrived at this interpretation based solely on “the
assumption that the legislative purpose is expressed by the ordinary
meaning of the words used.” 232
227. Bolanos-Hernandez v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 767 F.2d 1277, 1287
(9th Cir. 1984).
228. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 490 (Stevens dissenting).
229. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 486 (Stevens dissenting).
230. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
231. Id. at 482, quoting Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1 (1962).
232. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
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The Court held that Elias had failed to demonstrate that the
guerrillas would persecute him “because of that political opinion, rather
than because of his refusal to fight with them. . . .” 233 In the Court’s
view, the guerrilla organization’s interest in Elias-Zacarias would
likely be for the purposes of augmenting their troops and not to express
their displeasure at his refusal to join/fight with them. 234
This is an additional burden that applicants must meet to justify
the grant of political asylum. An applicant must show a causal nexus
between the political opinion and the threatened harm. “The mere
existence of a generalized ‘political’ motive underlying the persecutors
actions is no longer sufficient to draw an inference that persecution is
on account of political opinion.” 235 The Court did not meaningfully
elaborate on how an applicant is to prove the persecutors motive, but
“since the statute makes motive critical, he must provide some evidence
of it, direct or circumstantial.” 236
Following Elias-Zacarias, it appears that decision makers have
held that subjectively holding a political opinion will not establish a
claim. There must be an affirmative expression of a political opinion.
In addition to this, evidence must be produced to establish that the
persecutor will be motivated by that opinion. Thus, the Court’s decision
has narrowed the availability of political asylum by increasing the
standard that applicants must meet to satisfy a claim on this ground.237
It is noteworthy that this decision has been heavily criticized by
observers and legal scholars, particularly for its lack of consideration
to interpretative aids in requiring that applicants prove their
persecutor’s intent and lack of consideration for international
jurisprudence. For example, the Chair of Canada’s Immigration and
Refugee Board criticized the majority opinion for its failure to “cite a
single international precedent, judicial or academic” and noted that
most jurisdictions throughout the world had found that the refusal to
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. Thus, the Supreme Court disproved of the approach that had been taken by the
ninth circuit. See, e.g., Sangha v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 103 F.3d 1482 (9th Cir.
1997): “A number of our asylum cases decided before 1992 broadly defining persecution on
account of political opinion, based on the political opinion of the persecutors, have been
weakened by Elias.”
236. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
237. See, e.g., Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1487–91, (discussing how the Supreme Court has
narrowed its interpretation of the political asylum ground).
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join a guerilla group constitutes a political opinion. 238 The majority also
failed to consider the UNHCR Handbook, which acknowledges the
inherent difficulties asylum applicants face in obtaining evidence to
support their claim. It states, “it is hardly possible for a refugee to
‘prove’ every part of his case and, indeed, if this were a requirement
the majority of refugees would not be recognized.” 239 On the issue of
an imputed political opinion, no meaningful analysis was provided by
the Supreme Court in Elias-Zacarias. The Court simply stated that
there was nothing to suggest “that the guerrillas erroneously believed
that Elias refusal was politically based.” 240 It should also be noted that
the INA does not provide any guidance as to whether an imputed
political opinion is a ground for asylum.
The circuit courts do, however, seem to agree that an applicant
can satisfy a claim for political asylum based on an opinion that the
persecutor has been attributed to them. 241 In such cases, attention turns
to the views of the persecutor. The applicant must provide evidence
that the persecutors actually believed that he or she held a political
opinion. 242 The applicant must also provide direct or circumstantial
evidence that the persecutor was motivated because of that political
opinion. 243 In contrast, the BIA have been particularly hesitant to
recognize the doctrine of imputed opinion. 244
C. Canada
The position in the United States regarding the meaning of
political opinion can be contrasted with that adopted in Canada. The
leading authority on the definition of political opinion in Canada is the
238. R.G.L. Fairweather, Temporary Sanctuary Tends to Get Permanent; Political
Persecution, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 1992), https://www.nytimes.com/1992/03/07/opinion/ltemporary-sanctuary-tends-to-get-permanent-political-persecution-043892.html
[https://perma.cc/6DLT-XTYQ]. See James C. Hathaway, The Causal Nexus in International
Refugee Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 207, 208 (2002). See also Karen Musalo, Irreconcilable
Differences? Divorcing Refugee Protections from Human Rights Norms, 15 MICH. J. INT’L L.
1179, 1181 (1994).
239. UNHCR, HANDBOOK, supra note 201, at 39.
240. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 482.
241. See Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1489; Singh v. Ilchert, 63 F.3d 1501, 1508-09 (9th Cir.
1995); Haider v. Holder, 595 F.3d 276, 284 (6th Cir. 2010).
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See, e.g., Khudaverdyan v. Holder, No. 10-73346 (9th Cir. 2015).
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Supreme Court decision of Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward. 245 The
decision in Ward marks the first attempt by a superior court to attempt
to delineate the meaning and scope of the ground. However, even
within Canada, Ward has created uncertainty and inconsistency among
decisions. 246
Ward was a member of an Irish paramilitary group, the Irish
National Liberation Party (“INLA”), which, according to the Court,
was “more violent than the Irish Republican Army.” 247 Ward was
ordered to guard and execute two hostages. Instead, he secretly released
them because as a matter of conscience he felt that he could not kill
innocent hostages. He subsequently fled to Canada in fear of
punishment by the INLA, where he applied for refugee status.
In delivering the judgement, La Forest J observed that political
opinion has previously been interpreted as existing where persons fear
persecution on the basis “that they are alleged or known to hold
opinions contrary to or critical of the policies of the government or
ruling party.” 248 In his view, this interpretation is inaccurate because:
This definition assumed that the persecution from whom the
claimant is fleeing is always the government or ruling party, or at
least some party having parallel interests to those of the
government. . . . however, the Convention applies where the State
is not an accomplice to the persecution, but is simply unable to
protect the claimant. In such cases, it is possible that a claimant
may be seen as a threat by a group unrelated, and perhaps
even opposed, to the government because of his or her political
viewpoint, perceived or real. 249 (emphasis added)

Although La Forest J appears to suggest that political asylum may
be granted where the persecutor is not the state, he goes on to cite with
approval the Goodwin-Gill definition, as noted above. That is, that
political opinion should be understood broadly to include “any matter
245. See [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.) for an illustration of the principle of imputed political
opinion.
246. See, e.g., Klinko v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [2000] 3 F.C.
327 (Can.) and Femenia v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship & Immigration), [1995] F.C. No.
1455 (Can.), despite each attempting to follow Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [1993] 2
S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
247. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).
248. Id. at 746 (citing ATLE GRAHL-MADSDEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 220 (1966)).
249. Canada (Attorney-General) v. Ward, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.).

2020]

THE REFUGEES CONVENTION

549

in which the machinery of state, government, and policy may be
engaged.” 250 Thus, some linkage to the engagement of the government
or the state is needed to turn an opinion into one that is political.
However, according to La Forest J, there are two refinements
needed to be made to Goodwin-Gill’s analysis:
First, the political opinion at issue need not have been expressed
outright. In many cases, the claimant is not even given the
opportunity to articulate his or her beliefs, but these can be
perceived from his or her actions. In such situations, the political
opinion that constitutes the basis for the claimant’s well-founded
fear of persecution is said to be imputed to the claimant. The
absence of expression in words may make it more difficult for the
claimant to establish the relationship between that opinion and the
feared persecution, but it does not preclude protection of the
claimant.
Second, the political opinion ascribed to the claimant and for
which he or she fears persecution need not necessarily conform to
the claimant’s true beliefs. The examination of the circumstances
should be approached from the perspective of the persecutor, since
that is the perspective that is determinative in inciting the
persecution. The political opinion that lies at the root of the
persecution, therefore, need not necessarily be correctly attributed
to the claimant. Similar considerations would seem to apply to
other bases of persecution. 251

Under this standard, the Court ultimately found that the
applicant’s political opposition to the tactics of the INLA could be
imputed to him on the basis of his conduct in releasing the hostages he
was ordered to guard. The Court held:
To Ward, who believes that the killing of innocent people to
achieve political change is unacceptable, setting the hostages free
was the only option that accorded with his conscience. The fact
that he had or did not renounce his sympathies for the more general
goals of the INLA does not affect this. This act, on the other hand,
made Ward a political traitor in the eyes of a militant para-military
organization, such as the INLA, which supports the use of terrorist
tactics to achieve its ends. The act was not merely an isolated
incident devoid of greater implications. Whether viewed from
250. Id. (adopting GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 205).
251. Id.
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Ward’s or the INLA’s perspective, the act is politically significant.
The persecution Ward fears stems from his political opinion as
manifested by this act. 252

At first instance, the opinion imputed to Ward does not appear to
be political. However, the Court took a very expansive view of the
meaning of political opinion to include firstly a reluctance to act in the
way required or requested by an organization, even in circumstances
where there is no express disagreement with the organization’s values.
Secondly, the Court stated that the context in which an opinion is
political does not need to directly relate to the state entity but instead
includes institutions or entities which are involved in attempting to
shape the policies and practices of the state. It must be emphasized that
in determining whether the applicant is imputed with a political
opinion, the reference point is not the actual express or implied views
of the applicant, but rather the perception of the persecutor. If the
persecutor believes, even wrongly, that the sentiment of the applicant
which the persecutor finds objectionable is political in nature, that is
sufficient to attract the operation of this ground.
Another manner in which Ward expanded the scope of political
opinion was that the Court did not require the applicant to establish a
causal nexus between the suggested political imputation and the
persecution. Unlike the decision in Elias-Zacarias, La Forest J did not
appear to place any emphasis on the persecutor’s motives. In other
words, his Honor did not consider the possibility that the INLA may be
motivated to harm Ward for non-political reasons, which may have
included a desire to punish him for being disobedient as opposed to
being a political traitor.
The application of this principle in the US context has been
considered in Elias-Zacarias but as noted above, has not been firmly
answered, apart from the fact that US courts have indicated that a casual
nexus between the political imputation and the persecution needs to be
established.
D. Australia
There has been no attempt by an Australian court to define the
parameters of the political opinion ground, however they have
252. Id.
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described political opinions as being “diverse, imprecise, and even
idiosyncratic.” 253 In Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs
v Y, 254 Davies J held that “[t]he words ‘political opinion’ are ordinary
words of the English language and have not been the subject of judicial
exposition limiting their meaning in the context of the Refugees’
Convention.” 255
Australian courts have accepted the position that the ground be
interpreted in a broad manner, and that it not be limited to opinions that
have been overtly expressed. 256 Moreover, in line with Ward,
Australian courts appear to affirm that political asylum is available
where the persecutor is not the state. Thus, the ground extends to
actions that are perceived to be a challenge by a group that is opposed
to the state or government. 257
The clearest articulation of the ground is that by the Federal Court
in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y. 258 In
considering whether the Refugee Review Tribunal was correct in
holding that the applicant’s stance against systemic corruption by
government officers qualified as a political opinion, Davies J
articulated the following principles:
In the context of the Refugees’ Convention, an opinion could be
thought to be a political opinion if it were such as to indicate that
its holder . . . held views which were contrary to the interests of
253. Applicant A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225
(Austl.).
254. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y [1998] FCA 515 (15 May
1998) (Austl.) [hereinafter Minister v Y].
255. Id. at 4.
256. Guo v Minister for Immigration & Ethnic Affairs (1996) 64 FCR 151, 160 (Austl.)
(Beaumont J said that “A mere act or refusal to act may constitute the expression of political
opinion.” Beaumont summarized with approval of the broad principles set out in Canada
(Attorney-General) v Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689 (Can.). Although the High Court of Australia
subsequently reversed the Full Federal Court of Australia’s decision (see Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 191 CLR 559), none of the High Court Justices
criticized Beaumont J’s analysis of the term “political opinion.”
Australian courts have continued to adopt Beaumont J’s explanation. See, e.g., Minister for
Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y [1998] FCA 515 (15 May 1998) and Applicant N403
of 2000 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 1088 (23 August
2000).
257. C v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 366 (Austl.).
See also Devarajan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 796 (16
June 1999) (Austl.) (citing Saliba v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998)
159 ALR 247 (Austl.).
258. Minister v Y, supra note 254.
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the State, including the authorities of the State. A person may be
regarded as an enemy of the State by virtue of holding and
propounding views which are contrary to the views of the State or
its Government, or which are antithetic to the Government and the
instruments which enforce the power of the State, such as the
armed Forces, Security Forces and Police Forces or which express
opposition to matters such as the structure of the State or the
territory occupied by it and like matters. 259

This reasoning was cited with approval by the Full Court of the Federal
Court in V v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, 260 which
similarly concerned an applicant who had expressed an attitude of
resistance to corruption by police officers. Wilcox J stated:
As I understand Davies J, as a matter of law it is enough that a
person holds (or is believed to hold) views antithetic to instruments
of government and is persecuted for that reasons. It is not
necessary that the person be a member of a political party or other
public organisation or that the person’s opposition to the
instruments of government be a matter of public knowledge. Of
course, the higher the person’s political profile, the easier it may
be to persuade a tribunal of fact that the person has been persecuted
on account of political opinion, rather than for some other reason;
but that is a matter going to proof of the facts, not a matter of
law. 261

In the same case, Hill J stated:
It is not necessary in this case to attempt a comprehensive
definition of what constitutes ’political opinion’ within the
meaning of the Convention. It clearly is not limited to party
politics in the sense that expression is understood in a
parliamentary democracy. It is probably narrower that the usage of
the word in connection with the science of politics, where it may
extend to almost every aspect of society. It suffices here to say that
the holding of an opinion inconsistent with that held by the
government of a country explicitly by reference to views contained
in a political platform or implicitly by acts . . . With respect, I agree
with the view expressed by Davies J in Minister for Immigration
and Ethnic Affairs v Y . . . that views antithetical to
instrumentalities of government such as the Armed Forces,
259. Id.
260. V v Minister, supra note 209.
261. Id. at 363.
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security institutions and the police can constitute political opinions
for the purposes of the Convention. Whether they do so will
depend upon the facts of the particular case. 262

In applying the Full Federal Court’s decision, Justice Merkel in
Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs held that
resistance to systemic corruption and illegality in some circumstances
be regarded as a manifestation of a political opinion. 263 The Court held:
. . . exposure of corruption can, in a wide range of circumstances,
lead to political persecution. Thus, exposure of corruption in
circumstances where it so permeates government as to become
part of its very fabric can quite easily lead to a fear that the
exposure, of itself, may be imputed to be an act of opposition to
the machinery, authority or governance of the state. Likewise,
refusal to participate in a corrupt state system can also be seen as
an expression or manifestation of political opinion as the refusal
to participate may be imputed by the authorities to be a challenge
to the machinery, authority or governance of the state. Also, . . .
exposure of systemic corruption may be an expression of “political
opinion” even if the state is against corruption but is unable to
protect the applicant from persecution on this account. In such a
case, however, it may be difficult to establish that the exposure of
corruption is a manifestation of a political act such as defiance of,
or opposition to, the machinery, authority or governance of the
state. 264

Australian courts have also embraced the imputed political
opinion doctrine. In Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo,
the High Court confirmed that persons claiming refugee status may do
so on the basis of an imputed political opinion. For the purposes of the
Convention, a political opinion need not be an opinion that is actually
held by the refugee. It is sufficient for those purposes that such an
opinion is imputed to him or her by the persecutor. In Chan, Gaudron
J said:
“persecution may as equally be constituted by the infliction of
harm on the basis of perceived political belief as of actual belief.”
In the same case, McHugh J said that:
262. Id. at 367.
263. Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670 (23
August 2000) ¶¶ 13-34 (Austl.) [hereinafter Zheng v Minister].
264. Id. ¶ 32.
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“It is irrelevant that the appellant may not have held the opinions
attributed to him. What matters is that the authorities identified
[Mr Chan ] with those opinions and, in consequence, restricted his
liberty for a long and indeterminate period.” 265

A political opinion may be imputed, for example, based on a
person’s membership of a political party, an entity perceived to hold or
express political views, or simply on the basis of a person’s family
connections, race or ethnicity. It is important to emphasize however
that in the Australian context, the determinative factor has centered
around the perception and motivation of the persecutor. It is not enough
that an applicant may be politically motivated. The ‘critical issue’ is
whether the applicant can establish that the persecution is politically
motivated. 266
In Zheng v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs the
Federal Court of Australia held that “exposure of corruption or
whistleblowing can result in persecution by reason of an actual or
imputed political opinion’, 267 however, ‘a critical issue will
always be whether there is a causal nexus between the actual or
perceived political opinion said to have been manifested by the
exposure of corruption and the well-founded fear of
persecution’. 268

Thus, Australian case law appears to simply endorse the broadly
accepted, uncontroversial principles that have arisen in the analysis of
the ground. It follows that there has been no considered jurisprudence
in Australia on the meaning of political opinion. The cases that turn on
this issue often expressly state there is no need for an extensive analysis
of the concept and instead base their decisions on the facts of the case.

265. Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Guo (1997) 144 ALR 567, 570-71
(Austl.). See also Saliba v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 89 FCR
38, 49 (Austl.); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Y [1998] FCA 515 (15
May 1998) (Austl.) and NAEU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and
Indigenous Affairs [2002] FCAFC 259 (24 October 2002) (Austl.).
266. See NAEU of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous
Affairs [2002] FCAFC 259 (24 October 2002) (Austl.). See also Applicant A v Minister for
Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225 (Austl.). Zheng v Minister for Immigration
and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 670 (23 August 2000) [34] (Austl.).
267. [2000] FCA 670 (23 August 2000) [34] (Austl.) at 19.
268. [2000] FCA 670 (23 August 2000) [34] (Austl.) at 34.
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V. PROPOSED NEW DEFINITION OF POLITICAL OPINION
It follows from the above that there is no settled and clear meaning
of political opinion or the concept of an imputed political opinion. A
telling feature of the above analysis is that there is no consistency
regarding the approach to political opinion in the above jurisdictions.
This is despite the fact that ostensibly, they are all interpreting the same
legal instrument. This is of course not uncommon given that each of
the three countries is sovereign and not bound to follow or even give
meaningful weight to decisions by courts and other legal bodies in other
countries. However, what is unusual and unexpected from the analysis
of the above cases is the disinclination by courts in all of the above
jurisdictions, with the possible exception of Canada, to meaningfully
and fully consider the definition and scope of the political opinion
ground. This is the case especially given the importance that decisions
relating to refugee applications have on the welfare of asylum
applicants.
There have been no systematic and deep doctrinal endeavors to
articulate in an informative and compelling manner the nature and
scope of the definition of political opinion and the boundaries of this
concept. This has the regrettable effect of making decisions in this area
inconsistent and unpredictable. This uncertainty can also undoubtedly
create a hesitation to attempt to claim asylum on this basis. It is
imperative that this concept is given fuller legal attention and its
parameters more definitively circumscribed. In order to do this, it is
necessary to revert to the purpose of the Convention and to also be
cognizant of the evidential manner in which refugee claims are
determined.
Consistent with the aims and historical backdrop to the
Convention, all of the grounds, including political opinion, should be
given the broadest interpretation which is coherent and in accordance
with the connotation of the phrases. In relation to political opinion, the
key concept is that of politics. This is a fluid and evolving term. A
strong argument can be mounted that most areas of human endeavor
and human discourse have a political aspect given that decisions in the
political domain have the capacity to influence all areas of society. It is
this reference point that should guide the manner in which political
opinion is interpreted.
As we have seen, a sticking point that has arisen is whether or not
the decision to not hold a political opinion merits protection. This issue
has arisen frequently in the context of a refusal to adhere to the
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ideologies of or to join a violent group. In a landmark decision in 2012,
the UK Supreme Court held that the expression of neutrality merits
protection under the Convention, regardless of the underlying
motivation. 269 The Court held that doing nothing at all was the essence
of an expression of neutrality and refused to draw a distinction between
“conscientious or committed” neutrality and that which is simply a
matter of indifference. 270
This is in stark contrast to the position taken by the US Supreme
Court who despite being faced with the question, declined to rule on
the issue of neutrality. 271 It did however indicate that affirmative
conduct is needed to support the neutral opinion and said that the
motivation behind the neutral opinion is relevant. The failure of the US
Supreme Court to provide a firm decision in Elias-Zacarias has
resulted in confusion and a narrowing of the ground. 272 Denying
asylum to neutrals is inconsistent with the purposes of the Convention.
This tension is very important regarding current refugee flows to
the United States. This is because an increasing majority of asylum
claims lodged to the United States are made by applicants who are at
risk of persecution by violent criminal groups due to their opposing or,
in some cases, neutral political opinions. Examples of such groups
include guerilla organizations, drug cartels, and street gangs. These
groups are extremely prevalent in Central America, which is
considered one of the most violent regions in world, and as noted
above, Central America persons make up about half of all asylum
applications to the United States. 273
In fact, an enormous amount of recent refugee aspirants to the
United States have left their country because of the political volatility
and their opposition to events in their homeland. Venezuela is a good
example. The violent, fragile and unstable political landscape in
269. RT (Zimbabwe) v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38
(UK).
270. Id.
271. See Elias Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
272. Mejilla-Romero v. Holder, 600 F.3d 63, 72 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that “mere refusal
to join a gang does not constitute political opinion” even in circumstances where the Applicant
can show that the persecution was motivated by the resistance to gang recruitment). See also
Matter of S-E-G, 24 I.&N. Dec. 579, 588 (B.I.A. 2008) and Matter of E-A-G, 24 I.&N. Dec.
591, 596 (B.I.A. 2008). See also Sangha, 103 F.3d at 1490 (“In Elias Zacarias the Supreme
Court instructed us to change course. It held that an applicant’s refusal to fight in the context of
a forced recruitment is not enough by itself to show that the persecutor acted ‘on account of’ his
political views.”).
273. See Section I.D.

2020]

THE REFUGEES CONVENTION

557

Venezuela has resulted in the breakdown of the economic and social
institutions in that country. It has also led to an almost total fracturing
of the rule of law and unwillingness or inability of the government to
maintain community safety. In this context, most people simply do not
feel empowered to express opposition to any political acts. This will be
futile because it will not change events and it is likely in many cases to
endanger their safety.
Nevertheless, the core reason that many people are leaving
Venezuela is because of the extreme political events currently
unfolding in that country. It is these political events and people’s
beliefs and their opinions relating to those events that have motivated
them to seek asylum elsewhere. To assert that people in this group are
not seeking asylum because of their political opinion is a fundamental
misconception of the events underpinning their decisions and the
logical process which they undertook, leading to the decision to leave
their homeland. Thus, it is imperative that the reasoning in EliasZacarias is overturned. A broader definition of political opinion should
be adopted in keeping with that in the United Kingdom. This in fact is
the approach that has been taken in many parts of Europe, where
asylum seekers who are similarly placed to those leaving Venezuela,
specifically Syrians, are being granted asylum. 274
Another aspect of the definition of political opinion which is
unsatisfactorily dealt with in the relevant jurisprudence relates to the
issue of causation. There have been numerous decisions in the United
States and elsewhere where decision makers have accepted that a
refugee applicant has an adverse political opinion, but then ruled that
this is not the casual basis for the fear of persecution that the applicant
may have.
This approach is in nearly all cases logically and empirically
flawed because there is no causal standard that has been set by the
courts or legislature that needs to be established in order for a refugee
claim to be substantiated. A reading of the relevant authorities suggests
that the causation element is being used as a convenient linguistic tool
to deny refugee status and to quite often facilitate not carefully
grappling with closely examining and defining the meaning of political
opinion and its relevance to a particular case.
274. Allison Hall, Means or Ends? A Comparative Note and Reflection on “Imputed
Political Opinion” Asylum in the United States and Europe, 79 U. PITT. L. REV. 105 (2017)
(Note the UNHCR published a guidance note suggesting that this ground serves as a successful
basis for protection in the context of Syrians).
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Clearly a jurisprudentially sound approach needs to be established
and applied by the courts. To this end, in numerous other areas of law
including criminal law and torts it has been noted that causation is a
nebulous and difficult concept, especially in circumstances where there
are multiple events that contribute to a certain outcome. The meaning
of causation needs to be context sensitive to the area of law in question
and the evidence which is typically available regarding claims in the
relevant area. In nearly all refugee cases, the persecutor is not a party
and does not give evidence, and therefore it is impossible to interrogate
their motives, intentions and beliefs.
Additionally, if an applicant is denied refugee status simply
because they do not satisfy one of the grounds but nevertheless is at
risk of persecution, this can result in a tragic outcome for the applicant.
Thus, it follows that the grounds should be interpreted broadly and in a
manner which recognizes the limits of the evidential material that can
be tendered in any particular case. It is impossible in most cases for a
refugee applicant to tender first hand evidence from their persecutor
regarding the exact reason that they are being targeted. It is thus unfair
to expect a refugee applicant to demonstrate in a compelling manner
the exact casual basis for which they are being targeted.
A more realistic and coherent approach needs to be taken to issues
of causation. To this end, it is suggested that the appropriate casual
nexus should be satisfied where the evidence suggests that the
applicant’s political opinion is one or more of the reasons that they are
being targeted for persecution; there should not be a requirement that
it is an operative or the main reason that they are in fear of their safety.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The world is experiencing refugee flows which are at
unprecedented levels in recent human history. There are no obvious
solutions to this crisis and in fact the number of refugees is increasing
each year. The refugee crisis is being particularly felt by the United
States due to increasing volatility in the political and social situation in
its region, especially in Venezuela and other regions in Central
America.
The crisis caused by large numbers of asylum seekers has
generated a mass amount of media and social commentary. No
systematic approach to dealing with the crisis has been suggested. A
paradox that has emerged is that the increase in asylum seekers has
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been met with a reduction in the asylum cap in the United States and
also an increased determination by the United States Government to
physically prevent asylum seekers from reaching American soil. This
has been accomplished by closing American borders in locations which
are often pathways to the United States. Another paradox to emerge
regarding the lowering of the asylum cap is that despite the
significantly increased refugee demand, the cap in recent years has not
been met.
It is clear that the United States like many countries around the
world is experiencing difficulties regarding the best way in which to
approach the increasing refugee problem. In a large part, the solutions
to refugee flows are political and social in nature. The approach will
largely turn on the willingness of countries to absorb large amounts of
desperate people fleeing their homeland.
The approach however is not solely political. It also has a legal
dimension. The fundamental bulwark around which refugee claims
have been determined for nearly 100 years now in more than 140
countries including the United States is the Refugee Convention. This
instrument has provided the pathway for the settlement of millions of
asylum seekers worldwide. However, the instrument is equivocal in
relation to the exact profile of people who should be granted refugee
status. This uncertainty provides a further obstacle to people being able
to persuasively articulate their case for refugee settlement and can
diminish their inclination to assert grounds in the Convention as being
the basis for settling in a new country.
One of the five refugee grounds is political opinion. This is a
particularly important contemporary ground given that millions of
current displaced people have left their country of origin on the basis
of turmoil and conflict which has a political foundation. The capacity
of asylum seekers to use this ground as a pathway for settlement in their
country of refuge has been attenuated by the fact that the courts have
failed to comprehensively define the meaning of political opinion, and
to the extent that they have considered the term, it has been examined
in an ad hoc and narrow fashion.
Political opinion needs to be defined in a transparent and coherent
manner so that asylum seekers are in a position to foreshadow whether
their claims are likely to come within the scope of this concept. As we
have seen, two particular shortcomings regarding the current approach
that is often adopted to political opinion are that it is necessary for the
applicant to have a defined position regarding a political matter and the
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requirement to establish that this is a key cause of their fear of
persecution.
These approaches are flawed. They are inconsistent with the
purpose of the Refugee Convention and its history. A more coherent
approach would abolish the requirement that an individual must have
an established position regarding a political matter. To this end, an
approach in-line Canada should be adopted. Moreover, given the
evidential limitations that normally apply in relation to refugee
applications, there should be no requirement that an asylum seeker
must establish a strong casual nexus between political opinion and the
persecution. These changes will make the law in this area clearer and
more coherent and provide greater certainty and clarity to both asylum
seekers and decision makers, thereby enhancing the consistency and
fairness in the processing of refugee claims.

